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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this Article is to consider whether certain classic categories for
the analysis of the nature and reach of constitutional rights would be better
replaced by shifting our understanding of the nature of constitutions and the
appropriate way to interpret them. In particular, I wish to suggest this is so for
two pairs of contrasts; between positive and negative rights, and between the
horizontal and vertical effect of rights. By positive rights, sometimes called
socioeconomic rights, I mean an understanding of a right as entitling a citizen
to government action, to the production of some good, while a negative right
simply prohibits a government from doing something. For example, the right
to receive pension benefits in Hungary is a positive right, while the right to
publish without prior restraint in the United States is a negative right.
Equating positive rights with socioeconomic rights is an oversimplification
because the right to police protection against a known threat to life, or the right
to intervention by a welfare agency when one's father is a dangerous drunk are
positive rights, but not in any simple sense socioeconomic. The right to police
protection lay behind a difficult case arising in the United Kingdom, which
went to the European Court of Human Rights.' The right to welfare
intervention lay behind the complexities of the U.S. DeShaney case.2 Both of
these cases involve the claim that a right requires the government actually do
something, rather than to refrain from some action.
Vertical and horizontal effect refers to whom can be the bearer of rights
against whom, and is partly, but not completely, covered by the American
concept of state action. Vertical effect refers to the classic view that
constitutional rights lie to the citizen against the state, and that they are
necessarily only a matter for public law. The horizontal effect doctrine
suggests that one private citizen may owe a duty derived from a bill of rights
to another private citizen. In the American context, the ruling example is, of
course, Shelley v. Kraemer.3 The whole area of horizontal effect remains
highly controversial, even in thosejurisdictions like Germany and South Africa
where it is arguably good constitutional law that bill of rights duties may at
times apply between private citizens. I intend to argue that these conceptions
are secondary to, and largely unimportant after, a prior decision about how a
constitution should be understood and applied. To make this latter distinction,
Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1998).
2 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
3 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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I have borrowed an idea that first surfaced in a rather different context in
American constitutional scholarship-a distinction between "thick" and "thin"
readings.' This distinction is developed at some length later in this Article.
For convenience at this stage, it can be taken to mean a difference between
seeing a constitution as a value-impregnated document representing a society's
core values rather than a formal delineation of authority and power
relationships. A thick reading of a constitutional right attempts to respond to
a rights claim in a way fitting the overall ethical aspiration instantiated in the
constitution, while a thin reading seeks to apply a minimalist textual
interpretation. In the work from which I borrow the idea, discussed later, the
distinction is drawn between the range of issues involving "political justice"
and the range of issues orthodox or "thin" constitutional discourse sees as
capable of treatment.' In some ways, the analogy between a "literal" and a
"purposive" interpretation of a statute may help us to understand the
distinction. Negative and vertical rights orientations follow from, or are
examples of, thin readings, whereas the distinctions are useless, and may be
damaging if one is committed to thickly reading a constitution.
More generally, positive versus negative rights and horizontal versus
vertical effect are just some of the procedural categories used to limit the range
and efficacy of constitutional value commitments. If constitutions are to be
seen as macro tables of organization combined with limited listings of discrete
and freestanding prohibitions of certain government activities, they may be
useful. Increasingly, there is an alternative understanding of what constitutions
are; within this alternative perspective such distinctions are unnecessary and
pointless restrictions serving only to limit the full functioning of the
constitution as a value order. I do not claim that these distinctions cannot hold
up philosophically. My point is rather that they do not get us very far in
understanding, criticizing, or justifying much that goes on in some very
important constitutional systems. Instead, I suggest we need to look at a
different question: what model of the whole purpose of a constitution did its
interpreters have in mind? I suggest, though the point cannot fully be argued
here, that any constitution adopted or seriously modified in the last fifty years
is one where such classic distinctions are largely otiose. How we are to label
these constitutions is tricky because one is immediately in the realm of
ideological labelling, a realm where cross-national translatability is notoriously
4 Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional
Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410 (1993).
5 See discussion infra Part III.
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difficult. In one article, which shows how widespread the issue is, on positive
rights in Israel, the authors use the idea that these are constitutions arising
since the widespread penetration of socialist ideas.6 Such language will seem
overtly restrictive to those in countries manifestly not socialist. In a very
powerful argument from which I take much inspiration for my own, Frank
Michelman talks of "liberal justification"-but this is to use the word "liberal"
in American rather than British English.7 At this stage, I prefer to dodge the
question of to which constitutions my argument applies.
In addition to the positive/negative right distinction, the traditional
horizontal/vertical effect dichotomy and its American counterpart in the state
action doctrine are obvious candidates for this criticism. But the restrictions
on constitutional reach are broader and harder to characterize than simply these
famous distinctions. In the final section of this Article, for example, I take up
a well-known American example of constitutional theory that is not usually
seen in the light of my discussion-the welfare-as-property debate. In German
constitutional discourse, this is very much related to the idea of "positive
rights." Then there is the question of denying state liability for protecting one
citizen from another where some might see the state as having a duty of
care-DeShaney in the United States, Osman perhaps in the United Kingdom.8
The mere fact that these can be seen, and in the United Kingdom would
certainly be seen, as issues in tort law rather than normal constitutional law is
an indicator of the blindness to possible constitutional reach I wish to discuss.
As long as the law of torts is cast in terms of a form of insurance, with a heavy
emphasis on foreseeability, its very core concept, "the duty of care," can never
be taken as deeply as a constitutionally imposed duty would be. It is inevitable
that any major extension of horizontal effect will trample on an even more
basic classification in legal thought, that between public and private law.
Some of the German critics of the country's version of horizontal effect do
indeed regularly complain that constitutional law is invading the realm of
purely private legal relationships.9 Unfortunately, developing this line of
6 Yoram Rabin & Yuval Shany, The Israeli Unfinished Constitutional Revolution: Has the
Time Come for Protecting Economic and Social Rights?, 37 ISR. L. REv. 299 (2004).
7 Frank I. Michelman, The Constitution, Social Rights, andLiberal Political Justification,
1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 13 (2003).
8 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Osman v.
United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1998).
9 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 6, 2001, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 957 (F.R.G.), summarized in Constitutional Control of Martial
Agreement II: The FCCAffirms Its Path-BreakingDecision, GERMAN L.J., Sept. 2001, available
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argument would take a whole book even to spell out.' ° To make this point, I
discuss cases from two jurisdictional areas where a broad application of basic
values has been undertaken seemingly offending the classic distinctions, South
Africa and some of the Eastern European states. Frequently though, we come
across cases that are just very hard to force into the standard classifications at
all.
After introducing a recent Canadian case as an example of how hard it is
in practice to make some of these classic distinctions, Part II develops a critical
justification of positive rights and of giving horizontal effect to all rights. The
thesis is essentially that at least some modern constitutions were intended to
be transformative of social and political life, and must be seen as "purposive"
documents. The idea of transformative jurisprudence is borrowed from a
South African debate, which is carried out not only among scholars but every
bit as much by the judges themselves. Ultimately, I argue that even older
constitutions may have to be seen in this light if they are to continue
functioning. "
In June 2005, the Canadian Supreme Court handed down ajudgment which
might be thought to make much of our standard classification of constitutional
rights into positive versus negative rights potentially redundant. The case,
Chaoulli v. Quebec, was decided on a 7-2 split with a coruscating joint
dissent, and has already been attacked as an extreme invasion of the legislative
domain by a court. 12 The Supreme Court struck down a Qudbec statute that
made it illegal either to buy or to offer private health insurance.13 This is a
bulwark, also present in other Canadian provinces, to ensure the state health
at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com/currentissue.php?id=86 (involving a woman who
managed to persuade the Constitutional Court to overturn the impact of a prenuptial agreement
she had made not to seek financial support in the case of a divorce, arguing that alimony was a
constitutional right she had not had the power to renounce. German family lawyers were
extremely angry about this breach of the public/private divide.).
'0 Of course this is a staple of "critical legal thinking," as in Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 2, 351 (1973), but I have a broader and more strictly constitutional
perspective in mind.
" For an academic account of the idea of transformative jurisprudence, see Karl E. Klare,
Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 146 (1998).
For a judge's version, see Dikgang Moseneke, Transformative Adjudication, 18 S. AFR. J. ON
HUM. RTs. 309 (2002).
12 Chaoulli v. Qudbec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791. For commentary, see Recent
Case, Due Process-Right to Medical Access-Supreme Court of Canada Holds That Ban on
Private Health Insurance Violates Qudbec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 119 HARV.
L. REv. 677 (2005).
13 Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. 791.
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care system does not lose resources to the private sector. Both the court of
first instance and the Court of Appeal of Qudbec had upheld the statute, the
former after very lengthy and detailed empirical examination of expert
witnesses. 4 The argument of the claimants was very simple. The Quebec
health care system was overloaded and involved lengthy waiting lists for many
medical procedures. Patients, some of whom could have had private medical
treatment had they been allowed to buy private medical insurance, were
therefore dying or suffering prolonged and excessive reduction of their quality
of life. 5 The statute therefore abridged the citizen's right under the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. Article Seven of the Charter provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right
not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice."' 6 The majority opinion by Justice Deschamps describes
how she saw the issue:
when my colleagues ask whether Quebec has the power under the
Constitution to discourage the establishment of a parallel health
care system, I can only agree with them that it does. But that is
not the issue in the appeal. The appellants do not contend that
they have a constitutional right to private insurance. Rather,
they contend that the waiting times violate their rights to life and
security. It is the measure chosen by the government that is in
issue, not Quebeckers' need for a public health care system. 7
Does this case involve a positive or a negative right? s The right to life can
be a simple negative right against the state-when police get too trigger-happy
in the street, perhaps. It can be held to forbid capital punishment, as the
Hungarian Constitutional Court hurried to find in 1990 and the South African
Court found in 1994.' It can be used to ban abortion, given certain
14 Id.
'5 Id.
16 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11, art. 7 (U.K.).
17 Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. 791, para. 14 (emphasis added).
"S The Canadian Supreme Court has often discussed, and always struck down, the idea of
positive rights being justiciable in this way. The most recent and clear-cut case before Chaoulli
was Gosselin v. Qudbec (Attorney General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, where there were fierce
dissents by three of those in the majority in the later case.
9 Decision of Oct. 24, 1990 On Capital Punishment, Alkotm~inybir6sig [Hungarian
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assumptions about the legal status of the fetus. (Though here the right may
transgress another boundary and become a horizontally applicable right, given
that states themselves seldom seek to terminate life in utero.) In Chaoulli, it
is hard to see the right quite in these simple negative terms.2" Quebec is being
forbidden to do something-restrict insurance-because this policy, in
interaction with another policy-the funding level for the public health
service-increases the risk to life beyond some nominal level.2 Justice
Deschamps is clear about this: "the waiting times violate their rights to life and
security."22 This only makes sense against a measure, however vague, of a
minimal health entitlement because clearly the right to life cannot be breached
absolutely by any wait. As two of the concurring justices put it, "[b]y
imposing exclusivity and then failing to provide public health care of a
reasonable standard within a reasonable time, the government creates
circumstances that trigger the application of [Section] 7 of the Charter."23 The
dissenters in a sense agree:
What, then, are constitutionally required "reasonable health
services"? What is treatment "within a reasonable time"? What
are the benchmarks? How short a waiting list is short enough?
How many MRIs does the Constitution require? The majority
does not tell us. The majority lays down no manageable
constitutional standard. The public cannot know, nor can judges
or governments know, how much health care is "reasonable"
enough to satisfy ... [Charter Rights]. It is to be hoped that we
will know it when we see it.24
If the right to life in Canada is a negative right, the state would be prevented
only from intentional deprivation of life, not from bringing about a state of
affairs in which some may die when they could have avoided it but for the
state's action. At the very least, if negative, the right is negative in some
unusual way. It is a right to some condition, not to state inaction. The problem
really is not so much that this is not a negative right, but that the negative-
Constitutional Law Court] Magyar K6zI6ny [Hungarian Gazette] 107; S v Makwanyane &
Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) (S. Afr.).
20 Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. 791.
21 Id.
22 Id. para. 14.
23 Id. para. 105 (McLachlin, C.J. & Major, J., concurring).
24 Id. para. 163 (Binnie & LeBel JJ., dissenting).
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versus-positive distinction quite fails to capture what is extraordinary about
Chaoulli and can lead us not to notice how the substance of rights claims
accepted by constitutional courts is widening and changing rapidly.
25
There has long been a muted hostility on the part of constitutional experts
to the idea that a bill of rights might contain a special sort of right, usually
referred to as either a "positive right," a "socioeconomic right," or a "third
generation right."26 I refer to a muted hostility because it is hard to find any
extensive discussion. The idea that such rights are not real, or certainly not
justiciable, seems to have been more an article of faith than the result of
serious inquiry. Yet in the last fifteen years, such rights have, on several
occasions and in several countries, been successfully pleaded before
constitutional courts without dire political consequences.27 But positive rights
are only one of the ways constitutional jurisdictions are widening their scope.
At least as controversial is the idea of "horizontal effect," by which
constitutional rights are brought to bear on the behavior of private actors to
each other, rather than only on the state/individual relationship. Typically in
the literature this is translated, for purposes of American comparison, as a
version of the state action doctrine. While it is not clear that this translation
always helps, I am happy to adopt it here.28 Other situations where courts may
impose values drawn from a constitution outside the classic vertical negative
rights exist and are never easy to categorize. Perhaps the most important is
where the state is held liable, possibly for what may be explicitly described as
"constitutional damages," when it has failed to protect one individual against
25 Though it does not directly address this issue, a useful introduction to Canadian thinking
on socioeconomic rights in constitutional law is given in a major study of justiciability in
Canada: LORNE MITCHELL SOSSIN, BOUNDARIES OF JUDICIAL REvIEw: THE LAW OF
JUSTICIABILITY IN CANADA (1999). The points are covered more specifically in a review of
Sossin's book, David Wiseman, The Charter and Poverty: Beyond Injusticiability, 51 U.
TORONTO L.J. 425 (2001).
26 A very powerful critical analysis of the arguments against positive rights, though where
the main thrust is tangential to my concerns here, is given by Michelman, supra note 7.
27 Because of judicial activism in this area, the literature has of recent become more fully
worked out. The best attack on positive rights is probably Frank B. Cross, The Error ofPositive
Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 857 (2001). Much can be gained from the debate between Herman
Schwartz, an expert on East European constitutions, and Cass Sunstein on the issue. Herman
Schwartz, Do Economic and Social Rights Belong in a Constitution?, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1233 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-
COMMUNIST APPLICATION (Andrds Saj6 ed., 1996).
2 Mark Tushnet, The Issue ofState Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional
Law, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 79 (2003). I rely heavily on Tushnet's insights in this Article
throughout my discussion.
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actions of another, actions which would be unconstitutional (or simply
criminal) if carried out by the state itself. These later cases raise many of the
same concerns as both positive and horizontal rights jurisprudence without
quite being either. If we are to get some grasp, for either normative or
sociological analyses, on this expanding reach of constitutional values, we
need to find a way of treating all these forms of action, and perhaps others, as
part of a general thrust.
There has been considerable theoretical work on human rights in the last
twenty years, much of which has opposed the simple positive-versus-negative
distinction.29 However, this seems largely not to have touched the more
practical discussions in courts and by constitutional lawyers who concentrate
on what courts actually do, as opposed to philosophers and writers on
jurisprudence. Consider, for example, the useful literature on positive rights
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), where the distinction is
still retained even when opposition to the justiciability of such rights is
removed.3" As far as my practical concerns with using constitutions thickly,
or "richly," the ECHR would be better seen as a court that no longer maintains
a positive-versus-negative distinction. It may well be, as has often happened
in legal development, that a vocabulary will last longer than the ideas it grew
from. My aim here, therefore, might be seen as much a matter of pruning
vocabulary as actually pressing for new ideas. Either way, my goal here is to
sketch such a general categorization and to relate it to the overall nature of
constitutions. For now I retain the traditional categorizations to introduce the
core idea of a new approach. The next Part discusses some of the leading
cases across the range to develop further the main themes-that of a new
broader categorization and its link to rival conceptions of what a constitution
is.
II. POSITIVE RIGHTS AND HORIZONTAL EFFECT
In some jurisdictions, constitutional adjudication is taking on a role quite
unlike the traditional Western conception of it, a role within which positive
rights are not only permissible, but necessary. 3' As suggested earlier, I find it
29 A good start to this literature and approach is Ida Elisabeth Koch, Dichotomies,
Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?, 5 HuM. RTs. L. REV. 81 (2005).
30 See, for example, the careful analysis in ALASTAIR MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2004).
"' See D.M. Davis, Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African
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best to use a very simple definition of a positive right. The normal, "negative"
form of a constitutional right consists of a prohibition against the government
from doing something, for example, censoring speech or arresting an
individual without probable cause. A positive right involves an instruction to
the government to provide citizens with some benefit, for example, a pension,
medical treatment, or basic housing. Part of the reason the case against
positive rights has not often been made very fully may be that the concept
covers so much, and, for much of what it contains, the argument against it
hardly needs to be made. Where a constitution commits the state to full
employment policies, for example, it takes little argument to support the idea
that this does not give a justiciable claim to anything whatsoever. But not all
putative positive rights are anything like this. Nor, crucially, have all the
successful claims for judicial enforcement of socioeconomic benefits actually
been based on individually-oriented rights at all, but on more general
commitments to maintain certain constitutional values like "the rule of law."32
There are really two logically separable arguments usually deployed against
positive rights: one derived from the idea of the separation of powers, and one
derived from a restrictive notion of the competence and capacity of courts to
undertake certain types of analysis or to make certain types of decisions.
The basic arguments against positive rights focus on the nature of the
decision a court has to make if it enforces such a right. At times the argument
is dressed up in the language of the separation of powers.33 To grant a positive
right is to make a substantive, and often distributive, policy decision and such
matters, it is said, are simply not the province of the judiciary.34 The trouble
is that the separation of powers doctrine is itself under-theorized, as most of
it concentrates on why the executive and legislative powers should not invade
each other's territory or that of the judges, and revolves around avoidance of
tyranny. There is remarkably little account given of why, in principle, judges
should not trespass on the territory of the other two branches, except for a
generalized claim based on relative democratic legitimacy.35 Yet, though some
Constitution: Towards 'Deference Lite'?, 22 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 301 (2006).
32 See, e.g., David Robertson, A Problem of Their Own, Solutions of Their Own: CEE
Jurisdictions and the Problems ofLustration andRetroactivity, in SPREADING DEMOCRACY AND
THE RULE OF LAW?: THE IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT FOR THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST LEGAL ORDERS (Wojciech Sadurski et al. eds., 2005).
3 See Sunstein, supra note 27.
34 Cross, supra note 27.
5 A good example of this approach is an interesting recent study of what the author calls
"the new constitutionalism," RAN HIRSCHL, TowARDs JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
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people do become incensed about the lack of electoral legitimacy of an
appointed judiciary, it is unclear why the positive/negative distinction should
be relevant. Either it is part of liberal democracy that judges can override the
elected lawmakers where the constitution grants them this power or not; the
nature of the intervention is hardly germane.3 6 The separation of powers is
arguably an asymmetric doctrine: the ban on the executive or legislative
invading the court's province follows from the most entrenched of due process
ideas, the old common law rule of natural justice, nemo in sua causa, and
implies absolutely nothing about positive rights.
The less grandiose version of the argument focuses on competence--courts
do not have the wherewithal to make substantive decisions on who should get
what benefits from the state budget, and judges do not have the training to
make such choices. In fact, much the same argument can be made against
several major Western legislatures, which would leave the executive in sole
control. Nonetheless, there is clearly some merit in this argument, though
probably not enough to get very far in the real world. The argument from
competence can be divided into two parts. One part claims incompetence in
working out the technical details of a policy-how exactly a specified medical
benefit or housing entitlement should be delivered.37 It is probably true that
courts cannot do this as well as the executive, but it is not true that they
necessarily have to do this anyway as positive rights must be result-oriented.
One may have a justiciable right to a particular medical treatment or
educational benefit, but one cannot be seen as having a right to any specific
mechanism for the delivery of these rights.38 Chaoulli may well be on point:
the dissenters made much of the court's inability to assess the merits of the
Quebec health system, but in fact the majority never pretended to do any such
thing.39 The other part of the argument concentrates on the core question of
the entitlement to a costly benefit.4" This part, because it implies judicial
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTrruTIoNALisM (2004). He is part of a developing American
school of constitutional lawyers who are critical of and disappointed in courts, but not for
traditional reasons.
36 Furthermore, as some American writers note, critics of positive rights apply the argument
to such rights under American state constitutions, where the bulk of the judiciary is in some way
or other elected. See Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1131 (1999).
31 Cross, supra note 27.
38 See Minister ofHealth & Others v TreatmentAction Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA 721
(CC) (S. Aft.).
" Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791.
40 Cross, supra note 27.
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control over the state budget, is seen as necessarily unacceptable. The obvious
criticism of this part of the argument was made by the South African
Constitutional Court when it ruled on the compatibility of the final
Constitution with the fundamental principles set out in the Interim Constitution
it was due to replace.4 As the court said:
even when a court enforces civil and political rights such as
equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the order
it makes will often have such implications. A court may require
the provision of legal aid, or the extension of state benefits to a
class of people who formerly were not beneficiaries of such
benefits. In our view it cannot be said that by including socio-
economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon
the courts so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them
by a bill of rights that it results in a breach of the separation of
powers.42
In particular, the court noted that "[a]t the very minimum, socio-economic
rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion," '3 which is one way
of looking at what the Canadian Supreme Court did in Chaoulli.4 Similar
arguments have been made by some academic constitutional lawyers, and the
problem is not restricted to constitutional review."5
There is also the question of a state's constitutional "duty of care"
obligations. The most noted cases also involve the right to life, a right that has
been in constitutions for a very long time, but has always been a "negative"
right, denying the state's authority to take life except in special circumstances.
As soon as one conceives of the state having a duty to protect, one turns a
negative into a positive right. Can it possibly be the case that such a
distinction, tantamount to Clough's "thou shalt not kill; but need not strive
"' In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744
(CC) (S. Aft.).
42 Id. para. 77 (emphasis added).
41 Id. para. 78.
4 Chaoulli, 1 S.C.R. 791.
41 See DAVID ROBERTSON, JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, ch. 9 (1998).
Another useful discussion for the whole of this topic is Elizabeth Palmer, Resource Allocation,
Welfare Rights-Mapping the Boundaries ofJudicial Control in Public Administrative Law, 20
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 63 (2000).
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officiously to keep alive," can really produce non-justiciability? 6 Yet, of
course, major cases in the common law world involved in this complex of
horizontal effect/duty of care/positive rights have indeed turned on that, to note
only two-the classic American case, DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services and, before the ECHR, Osman v. United
Kingdom.
47
III. THIN AND THICK CONSTITUTIONALITY
I borrow the idea of a "thin" constitution from United States constitutional
argument. European academics do not always realize that the United States of
America, home of restrictive welfare conceptions and ofjudicial-constitutional
hostility toward anything resembling a positive right, has itself been engulfed
in a fierce debate on such rights, at least in academic circles, for several
decades.48 Though seldom with success, positive rights claims have certainly
been litigated, and have met with at least some judicial interest in state
courts.49 At the beginning of the article, whose title provides the heading to
this Part, Lawrence Sager comments:
Constitutional case law is thin in this important sense: the range
of those matters that are plausible candidates for judicial
engagement and enforcement in the name of the Constitution is
considerably smaller than the range of those matters that are
plausibly understood to implicate serious questions of political
justice. This moral short-fall is one of the most durable and
salient features of our constitutional life, one that begs for
explanation.5"
46 Arthur Hugh Clough, The Latest Decalogue, in THE OXFORD BOOK OF NINETEENTH
CENTURY ENGLISH VERSE 205 (3d ed. 1974).
" DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Osman v.
United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1998). The ECHR's real position on state duties to
protect life may be better seen in Edwards v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 487 (2002).
4 See, e.g., Hershkoff, supra note 36. Other articles with the common theme that positive
rights are already there in the United States waiting for judicial acknowledgment include: James
E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REv. 211 (1993); Jenna
MacNaughton, Comment, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need to Graft, Best Not to
Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750 (2001).
" See, e.g., James M. Scott III, II. Positive Rights-Right to Subsistence Under the
Connecticut Constitution, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 970 (1996).
50 Sager, supra note 4, at 410.
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Sager's argument, along with insights provided by Tushnet and Michelman,
is the core inspiration for this discussion. Sager suggests that one has to
choose between seeing the constitution itself as impoverished, as failing to
have relevance for most matters of political justice, or seeing the history of
U.S. constitutional law as one of systematic under enforcement of rights which
are actually there.51 A similar approach is quite common in U.S. lawjournals.
Several scholars in particular stress the fact that state, though not the federal,
constitutions very frequently contain positive or socioeconomic rights, but that
state courts have been over influenced by the U.S. Supreme Court's negative
attitude toward them. 2 I return to this issue.
A "thicker" constitution might be one where constitutionally enshrined
values permeate most legal decisions about when a duty is owed, largely
irrespective of who owes the duty or the precise nature of the duty according
to traditional categorizations. This thicker sense of the constitution's role is
hard to deal with within the orthodox language of positive/negative,
horizontal/vertical, tort liability of state agencies, and so forth, because these
categorizations impose artificial boundaries on a broader concern. Thus, there
is a move to seeing the constitution as embodying social values rather than
being predominantly a road map or table of organization.53 This seems a
plausible, if unusual, approach to some constitutions. It seems appropriate to
say that a modern, literate, politically sophisticated population, in adopting a
constitution, is making a choice that its society should be characterized by a
set of values and entitlements, and that governments, as well as other public
actors, have a duty to help deliver these. It makes much less sense that the
public intends such value instantiation to pass through a net of legal procedural
assumptions about which it knows nothing. Surely that was part of what the
South African and Eastern European electorates were doing when they voted
for replacements to their authoritarian systems. 4 It is at least arguable that
something similar was the intention of the Canadians in supporting their
Charter. One would be on much weaker grounds assuming the same support
for thick constitutionality with, for example, the United Kingdom's Human
Rights Act or the New Zealand act,55 given that these were imposed on a
"' Sager, supra note 4.
52 Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims:
The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERs L.J. 1057 (1993).
53 Moseneke, supra note 11.
14 ANDREW ARATO, CivIL SOCIETY, CONSTITuTIoN, AND LEGITIMACY 43-80 (2000).
55 HIRSCHL, supra note 35.
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largely ignorant population by elites.56 The extent to which one can attribute
this deeper sense of what a constitution represents when it comes about with
no widespread public involvement is very difficult to work out. Can a
governing elite commit a people to a value set without something like a
referendum or a general election that focuses the question? One reason it is
difficult is that there is everywhere considerable latitude given to governments
to make international commitments, which may bring with them value
commitments to a way of doing things inside the country.57 In the case of the
U.K.'s Human Rights Act, a large part of the government's motivation for
passing it was that the country was already committed to the European
Convention on Human Rights as a matter of international treaty obligation.
The fact that the United Kingdom regularly lost when one of its citizens took
it before the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg was a matter of considerable
embarrassment. The United Kingdom hoped that making the Convention
justiciable in British courts would reduce the number of such embarrassing
defeats. 59  Had Britain traditionally been a monist country in terms of
international law theory, as are most European countries, this would not have
mattered. A current example of the problem is that the South African
parliament is considering a constitutional amendment to get around its
Constitutional Court ruling against the death penalty.6° But the government's
legal advisors are stressing the incompatibility of the death penalty with
international obligations the Republic of South Africa has accepted.6' While
I present the issue here as one of legal theory, it may well better be seen as one
of political sociology. What really matters is whether a country's citizens see
56 Part of Hirschl's argument is that not only are the people not engaged in this type of
situation, but that the elites' motives are suspect. See id. I doubt his argument, but it is
nonetheless quite powerful.
" An obvious example is the accession to the European Union. When the United Kingdom's
Parliament passed the European Communities Act 1972, Section 2 provided that "[a]ll such
rights... from time to time created or arising by or under the Treaties... are without further
enactment to be given legal effect . . . [and] shall be recognised and available in law .... "
European Communities Act 1972, 1972, c. 68, § 2(1). Thus, values were incorporated which,
at the time, neither the government nor the public can be said to have chosen.
5 UK General Election 1997, Party Manifestos, Labour Manifesto, New Labour Because
Britain Deserves Better, available at http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/lab97.htm (last
visited Apr. 8, 2007).
'9 RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN UK-CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Gavin W.
Anderson ed., 1999).
60 Moyiga Nduru, Calls for the Return of Capital Punishment in South Africa, INTER PRESS
SERVICE NEWS AGENCY, June 7, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33527.
61 Id.
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their constitution in a particular light, though this will in turn be influenced by
the way the political elite talk about it. At least one reason the United
Kingdom's citizenry is lukewarm about the Human Rights Act is that the
government, which introduced it, now castigates the judges every time they
thwart government policy by applying it.
One can think of a spectrum, one end of which represents a fully conscious,
intentional public acceptance of a constitution as embracing a value compact,
and the other as public indifference to, or possibly ignorance of, any value
aspect to the constitution. On such a spectrum, other countries might be seen
as in a middling position. Exactly what the French thought they were doing in
1958 when they gave the Fifth Republic Constitution resounding support
cannot be known, but it was certainly not a vote just to continue the past. The
Conseil constitutionnel has argued powerfully and creatively that this vote, by
ratifying values in the preamble to the Fourth Republic Constitution and the
1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man, justifies it in applying its own
construction, the Bloc de constitutionnalit&6 2  If one considers cases
concerning equality and nondiscrimination in France, it is clear that what I call
a "thick" reading of a constitution certainly takes place, and that judicial
creativity has made this possible despite the actual text of the French
constitution being an open invitation to thin readings. One set of cases in
particular is of interest because it shows that there is no necessary connection
between the "thickness" of a reading and the "liberalness" of that reading in
the usual sense that "liberal" is used. These are the cases on gender equality
in the electoral system where the Conseil constitutionnel held for as long as
possible to a strong sense of Republican equality, which forbade taking notice
of a politician's gender in writing electoral laws that would have mandated a
quota of female candidates.63 In the end, the Conseil had to bow to a
constitutional amendment, which in itself makes a useful point: thick readings
are not dangerous to democracy but may well force a very clear public
statement of what the constitutional values are if equally thick judicial and
political readings conflict.'
62 FERDINANDMtLIN-SOUCRAMANiEN, LEPRINCIPED'EGALITE DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE DU
CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 219-21 (1997).
63 The cases come from a period stretching from 1982 to 2000. CC decision no. 82-146DC,
Nov. 18, 1982, J.0. 3475; CC decision no. 98-407DC, Jan. 14, 1999, J.O. 1028; CC decision
no. 2000-429DC, May 30, 2000, J.0. 8564. For a good analysis, see Louis FAVOREU & Loic
PHILIP, LES GRANDES DECISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 554-60 (12th ed. 2003).
64 See FAVOREU & PHILIP, supra note 63.
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Similarly, one might not be able to claim that the Polish or Czech
populations had anything very clear in mind in embracing their new
constitutions; no one could deny that the judicial stress on reintroducing the
rule of law (and interpreting that phrase very thickly) in these countries is
something the people cannot be held to have wanted.65
I propose therefore to claim that a "thick" reading of a constitution, one
which ignores traditional legal restrictions in order to ensure the delivery of
entitlements and the saturation of public life with constitutional values, is
appropriate for at least some societies. The societies in which a thick reading
is appropriate are especially those where the constitutions, in their bills of
rights, and frequently, in their preambles and limitations clauses, spell out the
core values.66 At this stage, progress can only be made by exploring the cases,
which the rest of this Article does. This way I hope to give some substance to
Sager's idea of delivering political justice67-by looking at cases where it
would be just to activate these rights and unjust to refrain from doing so
because they fail to fit a negative or vertical test. In the alternative, I discuss
cases where a court has applied thick readings and has refused to let classic
legal doctrines and categories get in the way of delivering constitutionally
derived justice.
In fact, some courts, including above all the South African Constitutional
Court, are actually charged by their constitution with the duty of developing
their common law in the light of constitutional values.68 A very good example
of how to read existing legal doctrine through constitutional eyes is a recent
South African case where three policemen, while on duty, gave a lift to a
woman stranded in a city and then raped her.69 A standard common law
problem of vicarious liability was transformed into a constitutional issue when
the Constitutional Court overturned the courts below.7 ° The lower courts had
65 Robertson, supra note 32.
66 Although he would probably be as surprised as anyone at the Chaoulli decision, David
Beatty describes this process of deducing a social value compact from constitutional language
very well in his account of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence in David Beatty, The Canadian
Charter of Rights: Lessons and Laments, 60 MOD. L. REv. 481 (1997).
67 See Sager, supra note 4.
68 See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 8(3)(a): "in order to give effect to a right in the Bill,
must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give
effect to that right .... "
69 K v Minister of Safety & Sec. 2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) (S. Afr.).
70 Christopher J. Roederer, The Constitutionally Inspired Approach to Vicarious Liability
in Cases of Intentional Wrongful Acts by the Police: One Small Step in Restoring the Public's
Trust in the South African Police Services, 21 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 585 (2005).
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insisted on applying a test by which the huge deviation between what the
policemen did and what their employer intended them to do precluded
vicarious liability of the latter.7 This decision is a very clear indication that
at least some modem constitutions are value-imposing public decisions, not
road maps. Here, O'Regan, for the court, early equates the South African
Constitution to the German Constitution. She cites approvingly a German
statement that the Basic Law embodies "an objective value system which, as
a fundamental constitutional value for all areas of the law, acts as a guiding
principle and stimulus for the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. ' 2
O'Regan insists that: "Our Constitution is not merely a formal document
regulating public power. It also embodies, like the German Constitution, an
objective, normative value system., 73  The full extent of this radiation of
constitutional values is considerable. It extends to a duty to "be alert to the
normative framework of the Constitution not only when some startling new
development of the common law is in issue, but in all cases where the
incremental development of the rule is in issue. 74 In the present case, the
constitutional right to safety, combined with the police force's duty to ensure
this right, operates to make the police authority liable vicariously. Not only
did the policemen rely on their positions to trick the woman into trusting them,
but they committed a further sin of "constitutional omission" because their
duty was precisely to protect her. 75 The South African Constitution may be
clearer on this point than many, but others certainly imply a duty like that set
out specifically in South Africa's section 39(2)--the Canadian Charter does,
and some readings of the U.K.'s Human Rights Act would impose a like duty
on the courts.76 What differs is more the willingness of the courts to develop
7' Minister of Safety & Sec. 2005 (9) BCLR 835 paras. 8-9.
72 Id. para. 15.
73 Id.
71 Id. para. 17. Section 39(2) of the South African Constitution reads: "When interpreting
any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal
or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." S. AFR. CONST.
1996, § 39(2).
" The duty of a court to act where legislation is inadequate leading to a constitutional
omission is also found explicitly in the Hungarian Constitution, though there it does not apply
to acts of individuals. See CONSTITUTIONALJUDICIARY IN ANEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (Ldszl6 S6lyom & Georg Brunner eds., 2000) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY].
76 A good analysis of the extent to which the United Kingdom's Human Rights Act can
create a "rights culture" is Janet L. Hiebert, Parliament and the Human Rights Act: Can the
JCHR Help Facilitate a Culture of Rights?, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1 (2006).
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the constitutional law thickly than the material available with which to do so.
How much of the South African willingness to give a thick reading follows
from the influence of the German court is hard to know. Certainly it does
regularly cite German case law, 7 but this is common among post-1990 courts
everywhere. 7' The influence of German constitutional law is hard to
overemphasize, but as yet not fully treated in the scholarly literature. There
are clear examples in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Hungary,
though in this case, the sources of the influence are clearer: many of the
Hungarian academic experts, as well as some of the country's judges, studied
in Germany before their anti-communist revolutions. 79 The South African
court has less training in continental European legal thought, obviously.
Indeed, references to German cases in South Africanjudgments are sometimes
directly made to the standard English language treatments of the court, like
those of David Currie and Donald Kommers, 80 rather than to actual German
court reports. At times, the South African judges themselves seem unsure as
to how some German concepts got into their constitutional law. This was
particularly clear, for example, in early discussions of the limitations clauses
in the first version of the South African Constitution, which appears to have
been modelled on the German Basic Law. The concept, that no law shall
abridge the "essential content" of a right, raised considerable difficultly for the
court:
Section 33(1)(b) provides that a limitation shall not negate the
essential content of the right. There is uncertainty in the literature
concerning the meaning of this provision. It seems to have
entered constitutional law through the provisions of the German
Constitution, and in addition to the South African Constitution,
71 See, e.g., Decision 18/2000 of June 5, 2000 on Scaremongering, Alkotminybir6sig
[Hungarian Constitutional Law Court] 1316/B/1996, Magyar K6zlny [Hungarian Gazette]
2000/54.
78 HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FORCONSTITUTIONALJUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE (2000).
'9 Including the first president of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, LMszl6 S61yom. There
is an excellent treatment of the German influence on that court in CATHERINE DuPRt, IMPORTING
THE LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE
RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY (2003). S61yom's own account suggests a less automatic influence
than does Dupr6's account. See CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra note 75.
10 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1994);
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY (2d ed. 1997).
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appears, though not precisely in the same form, in the
constitutions of Namibia, Hungary, and possibly other countries
as well.81
This was a crucial case early abolishing the death penalty, and the German
constitutional case law on sentencing was extensively quoted, but all citations
were from Kommers and Currie.82 It is interesting to note that this
troublesome concept was omitted, probably partly because of the difficulty
judges had with it, in the final version of the constitution in 1996. The South
African court does indeed make extensive use of other nations' jurisprudence,
as it is encouraged to in the constitution, but it is in no sense a slavish
following. It often uses U.S. cases too, but as Albie Sachs, one of its leading
members, has pointed out, much more frequently in the dissenting opinions.83
It seems more to be a case of Germany being the first country to embark on a
thickly read constitution acting as a beacon to others, rather than a careful
transmission of dogma. In the South African case, of course, the dominant
Dutch-Roman model of legal thinking makes a continental European grafting
onto a case law country more natural than it might be elsewhere.
It might be objected that to see all such issues as examples of the normal
legal process of applying a duty of care is inappropriate, and I certainly use it
only as a heuristic device here. Nonetheless, a focus on the "duty" aspect
rather than the "rights" aspect may help. As far as seeing a constitution as a
value statement goes, the emphasis certainly helps. An interesting parallel
argument for seeing constitutional adjudication less as a matter of rights claims
and more as concerning acceptable arguments for the state doing or failing to
do something is made by Richard Pildes and touches on the whole idea of thick
or thin reading.84 Constitutional adjudication is indisputably about vetting
arguments, and as such has little actual use for categorizations of claims. In
more concrete terms, the huge literature, and even greater mass of case law, on
both limitations clauses and the jurisprudence of legitimate discrimination are
much more about how to instantiate constitutional preambles with their value
declarations than about granting some, but not other forms of rights. 5 An
8 S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) para. 132 (S. Aft.).
82 KOMMERS, supra note 80.
83 Albie Sachs, Justice, Const. Ct. S. Aft., Private Lecture at Middle Temple, London (July
23, 2006).
84 Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998).
85 DAVID ROBERTSON, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE
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extreme version of my argument might indeed be that the way we see
constitutional arguments currently makes it look rather like the old common
law concentration on forms of action than it can really be. For simplicity of
exposition, one can see the process of thick reading as contained within two
dimensions. One dimension covers the range of the constitutional values over
actors, the other the range of values to be instantiated. The first dimension is
in large part about the horizontal effect distinction. The second contains,
though is not limited to, the positive rights/negative rights distinction. The
next section of this discussion is about dimension one, the range of
constitutional values across actors.
IV. THE FIRST DIMENSION: CONSTITUTIONAL THICKNESS AND
HORIZONTAL EFFECT
This "thicker" orientation to constitutionalism is of course seen
preeminently in the work of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which,
as I note above, has had a marked and openly avowed influence on the
Hungarian and other Central and Eastern European courts in addition to the
South African courts.86 Arguably the horizontal/vertical dispute most closely
and directly involves the idea of thick constitutionalism. Certainly a
methodology rather like the German version of proportionality makes
constitutions more easily thickly interpreted because of the inevitable
balancing of values that a wide-ranging judicialization of political justice
involves.8 7 Admittedly, though having its admirers, the German version of
horizontal effect, usually described as giving constitutional rights a radiating
effect into other legal contexts, has not been much applied. Until very
recently, the South African Constitutional Court (SACC) has been unwilling
to use the horizontal effect powers the politicians gave it, at first weakly in the
Interim, then more defiantly in the final Constitution."8 In a recent case I will
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (forthcoming 2008).
6 See discussion supra Part III.
87 The whole area of German constitutional interpretation is rich and complex. Useful ideas
for my point here are found in Susanne Baer, Equality: The Jurisprudence of the German
Constitutional Court, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249 (1999). The classic text used by the South
African Constitution Court (SACC) itself is KOMMERS, supra note 80.
88 President of RSA & Another v Modderklip Boerdery Ltd. & Others 2005 (8) BCLR 786
(CC) (S. Aft.). A fascinating account of the difficulties that drafters of the Interim Constitution
had with the legal profession over horizontal effect is given in RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW
CHASKALOSN, THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: A HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S
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consider later, the SACC handed down an order virtually identical to that of
the court below, but refused to use the horizontal effect doctrine deployed
there and instead fell back on a version of a general rule of law argument.89
This argument itself, however, looked more like the distinctly "thick" readings
of the "rule of law" found in Eastern Europe than a classic common law world
reading. On the other side, the Canadian Supreme Court famously stamped
down hard the first time it was invited to make the Charter horizontally
effective. The opportunity occurred in a case where a trade union claimed that
an injunction against secondary picketing breached the Charter rights of
freedom of association.9" What was at stake was whether the Charter's
provision that it applied to the "Parliament and government of Canada" could
make courts, as part of the state, unable to apply any law in breach of a Charter
right.9 The Canadian court was clear that it was not to be seen as part of the
state in that sense and left only the narrowest of openings for some form of
indirect horizontal effect, ruling that courts should develop common law "in
a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the
Constitution."92 The Canadian court accepted that the Charter must govern
common laws as well as statute, but only when the government was directly
implicated in the litigation. No principled reason was given for this
restriction-the arguments were pragmatic:
[T]he better view is that the Charter applies only to government
action. To hold otherwise would be to increase the scope of the
Charter immeasurably. In cases involving arrests, detentions,
searches and the like, to apply the Charter to purely private action
would be tantamount to setting up an alternative tort system.93
It was vital that the Canadian Supreme Court establish firmly that it is not
part of the government for Charter purposes, lest it be caught by the "state
action" argument the Americans have used to justify horizontal effect in the
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (Hart Publishing 2000) (1999).
89 See discussion supra Part II.
9o Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
91 Id. For commentary, see W.A. BOGART, COURTs AND COUNTRY: THE LIMITS OF
LITIGATION AND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE OF CANADA (1994).
92 Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, [1986] 2 S.C.R. at 603.
93 Id. at 597 (quoting A. Anne McLellan & Bruce P. Elman, To Whom Does the Charter
Apply? Some Recent Cases on Section 32,24 ALTA. L. REv. 361, 367 (1986)).
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rare case they have allowed it. The court achieved it by fiat in a virtually
tautological argument:
The courts are, of course, bound by the Charter as they are bound
by all law. It is their duty to apply the law, but in doing so they
act as neutral arbiters, not as contending parties involved in a
dispute. To regard a court order as an element of governmental
intervention necessary to invoke the Charter would, it seems to
me, widen the scope of Charter application to virtually all private
litigation. All cases must end, if carried to completion, with an
enforcement order and if the Charter precludes the making of the
order, where a Charter right would be infringed, it would seem
that all private litigation would be subject to the Charter.94
The italicized words are important-to the Canadianjudges it appeared that
the court could in some sense be neutral as to whether the values of the Charter
should pervade Canadian society or not. 95 This interpretation is a perfect
definition of a "thin" view of a constitutional court's business. It is interesting
to note in passing that the Human Rights Act in the United Kingdom, perhaps
intentionally, removed this escape route. The Act refers not to government but
to "public authorities," and the only example it provides is that a court is a
public authority.96 The main argument of the Canadian court in this case is not
an argument at all, but a firm statement that bills of rights exist only to protect
individuals from the state, and thus it is simply "inappropriate" to broaden
them.97 There is no recognition of the idea that rights need protecting against
all powerful abusers. Even Shelley v. Kraemer, restrictive though it is, gives
more chance of a thickness to constitutional reasoning than is possible in
9" Id. at 600-01 (emphasis added).
95 Id.
96 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 6 (U.K.):
(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible
with a Convention right.
(3) In this section "public authority" includes-
(a) a court or tribunal, and
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public
nature ......
9' Didi Herman, The Good, the Bad, and the Smugly: Perspectives on the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, 14 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 589 (1994).
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Canada, at least in this respect." However, it is always difficult to know quite
how to characterize American state action doctrine in a comparative context.
Is it best seen as the gateway through which a thick reading may be given or
the limits to such a reading? As one commentator pointed out on "state action"
during the Burger era, the language of the Constitution:
defines, on the one hand, a governmental duty, such as a duty to
provide all citizens the equal protection of the law. Any private
conduct which is deemed state action is subject to this duty. On
the other hand, the concept of state action is a dividing line that
bars the use of these constitutional restrictions on government to
regulate purely private life and private decision-making.99
Some of the best arguments against thick, value-enshrining constitutional
arguments exist within the American literature that supports the restrictiveness
of Shelley, especially the arguments stressing the meaningfulness of value
pluralism.)° °
Very probably horizontal effect in the sense of a freestanding right whereby
one individual would sue another for deprivation of a constitutional right,
absent any other legal basis, has never been intended by any constitution
drafter, mainly because it would not have occurred to anyone. To the extent
that there are any English answers as yet, the firm statement, perhaps obiter,
by Dame Butler-Sloss in one of the few English cases where any such claim
has been made that "the claimants in private law proceedings cannot rely upon
a free-standing application under the convention," very probably represents
what will become the law.' But strict direct horizontal effect-one private
actor suing another for breach of a constitutional right where no common or
statutory law applies-is a difficult scenario to imagine. The classic cases are
not like this. 2 Dolphin in Canada, Du Plessis in South Africa, Shelley in the
98 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
99 R.B.T., Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840, 841 (1974).
"o See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of
Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REv. 302 (1995);
Maimon Schwarzschild, Value Pluralism and the Constitution: In Defense of the State Action
Doctrine, 1988 SuP. CT. REv. 129 (1988).
101 Venables v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R. 908, 919.
102 Geddis gives an interesting analysis of the way some New Zealand judges are toying with
strict direct horizontal effect, and the New Zealand Bill of Rights was, after all, the model for
the U.K.'s Human Rights Act 1998. Andrew Geddis, The Horizontal Effects ofthe New Zealand
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United States, and even the paradigmatic Luth in Germany all involve people
seeking to escape from having a well established law applied to them because
it breached a constitution." 3 Even if Du Plessis and Dolphin were not
necessarily wrongly decided, it is fairly clear that there is something odd-let
us call it "thin"--about these situations. Essentially, it means ruling that the
constitution allows an existing common law rule to be applied in a way that
would be unconstitutional in a newly drafted statute. These cases are about
balancing rights, usually one right well entrenched in either the common law
or its equivalent, against another derived from the constitution. These cases
involved, variously, the right not to be defamed (Lfith), the duties of those
under restrictive covenants (Shelley), and protection against the inducing of a
breach of contract (Dolphin).'° These entrenched rights come up against a
new moral order that invites a balancing against other less familiar rights,
which almost serve as new defenses to be argued, and which fit quite well with
Pildes' claim that balancing rights is seldom a good description of what goes
on in these cases.'0 5 Any court in this position has to weigh principles. The
German court, with its proportionality doctrine, finds such weighing a natural
thing to do because it has already committed to the idea of the constitution as
a new and prevailing moral order.0 6 The arguments of courts which refuse to
do this, as with the Canadians, the South Africans at times, and usually the
Americans (for Shelley is, after all, very restrictive), are eclectic. While there
is no standard reason produced for not giving the thicker understanding of a
constitution, the attitude cited earlier from Dolphin is typical, that "to apply the
Charter to purely private action would be tantamount to setting up an
alternative tort system.""' 7 However, this argument is invalid if one starts from
Bill of Rights Act, as Applied in Hosking v. Runting, 2004 N.Z. L. REv. 681 (2004).
103 In Shelley, 334 U.S. 1, the Court upheld a decision that refused to enforce restrictive
covenants to not sell houses to black families on the grounds that a court's involvement would
implicate racial discrimination contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Du Plessis & Others v
De Klerk & Another 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) (S. Aft.), was the first horizontal effect case under
the Interim Constitution, and it involved an attempted defense against a defamation suit using
that constitution's freedom of speech guarantee. See also Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store
Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [ 1986] 2 S.C.R. 573; Lath, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG]
[Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 198 (F.R.G.).
104 See supra note 103.
105 See Pildes, supra note 84.
106 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legal Cultures of Europe, 30 L. & Soc'y
REv. 55 (1996).
107 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the premise that constitutions, when drafted, are intended to produce a
radically pervasive spread of new values throughout a system. Perhaps the
designers of the Canadian Charter had no such intentions, though nothing in
it precludes such an interpretation. Equally, there can be no doubt that the
German and the Central and Eastern European constitutions were specifically
so aimed. In part, the question for us is whether it is possible any longer to
refuse to hold this newer view of constitutions. The rest of this discussion
proceeds by discussing cases in two contrasting modem constitutional settings:
post-apartheid South Africa and post-communist Eastern Europe.
V. SOUTH AFRICA'S DUPLESSIS CASE IN DETAIL
It might seem odd to analyze Du Plessis, given that the court in this case
decided not to apply a horizontal-effect rationale.' It is precisely because in
it one can see the tension between this decision and the general thrust of
modem South Africanjurisprudence that it helps us consider why constitutions
should be interpreted thickly. From the earliest days of South Africa's post-
apartheid constitutional discourse, one finds, repeatedly and proudly, claims
that the constitution is indeed meant to be a value-pervading instrument. 10 9 In
this early case, this approach seemed to be rejected through a fear of horizontal
effect." 0 The majority's argument in Du Plessis, like the Canadian argument
in Dolphin, is purely pragmatic, focused largely around the idea that imposing
constitutional values on the common law is too big a task, even an
inappropriate one, for the Constitutional Court."' At the same time, the
dissent by Justice Kriegler is the most powerful of all cries that under a new
constitution this is a task that absolutely must be carried out."2 For the
majority, the problems of direct effect were just too great. The main opinion
by Justice Kentridge contains many of such anxieties, amounting almost to a
confession of inadequacy on the part of the Constitutional Court." 3 The
10' Du Plessis 1996 (5) BCLR 658.
o9 See, e.g., Margaret A. Burnham, Cultivating a Seedling Charter: South Africa's Court
Grows Its Constitution, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 29 (1997).
1' The SACC has moved on from this early position in K v Minister of Safety & Security
2005 (9) BCLR 835 (CC) (S. Aft.). The argument was a development of ideas found four years
earlier in Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security & Another 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) (S.
Afr.), so the restrictive approach discussed in this section was not long lasting.
. DuPlessis 1996 (5) BCLR 658.
12 Id. para. 113.
"3 Id. para. 53.
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argument is essentially that constitutional review is difficult and the judges
should defer to parliament even where, because it was common law, there was
no parliamentary intent to defer to!
The majority's preference is that constitutional values should permeate via
the routine common law interpretative work of the ordinary courts. t4
However, this position, perhaps the most common one internationally, is
subject to a fatal logical flaw. What if the ordinary courts do not perform this
function? What happens where a litigant pleads that the existing law be
modified in the light of the constitution and the court refuses? Either the
constitution gives a litigant a right of appeal to the constitutional court, or the
constitutional values do not operate within the system. There is no way out for
the court. If it truly believes in a thick interpretation, it cannot logically deny
a form of direct horizontal effect and cannot permanently evade taking cases.
In fact, even those who support the decision in Du Plessis have had to read a
long-stop protection by the Constitutional Court into the majority opinion,
somewhat unconvincingly." 5 Whatever they may say, only ajudge committed
to thin constitutionalism can take the position the majority took on this case.
The question is whether the South African Constitution actually permits a thin
reading. But it was not only those whose commitment to the all-pervasive idea
of a constitution in any case being weak who rejected horizontality here. The
oddity of the decision is perhaps best shown by the fact that the court's most
radical member, Justice Sachs, stated thus:
I have no doubt that given the circumstances in which our
Constitution came into being, the principles of freedom and
equality which it proclaims are intended to be all-pervasive and
transformatory in character. We are not dealing with a
constitution whose only or main function is to consolidate and
entrench existing common law principles against future
legislative invasion. Whatever function constitutions may serve
"'i Id. para. 62.
115 Chris Sprigman & Michael Osborne, Du Plessis is Not Dead: South Africa's 1996
Constitution and the Application of the Bill ofRights to Private Disputes, 15 S. AFR. J. ON HUM.
RTS. 25 (1999). The decision was generally criticized by South African commentators for failing
to live up to the promises of the constitution, though there are misgivings as to whether the
situation will change under the final constitution. Stuart Woolman & Dennis Davis, The Last
Laugh: Du Plessis v De Klerk, Classical Liberalism, Creole Liberalism and the Application of
Fundamental Rights Under the Interim and the Final Constitutions, 12 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS.
361 (1996).
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in other countries, in ours it cannot properly be understood as
acting simply as a limitation on governmental powers and action.
Given the divisions and injustices referred to in the postscript, it
would be strange indeed if the massive inequalities in our society
were somehow relegated to the realm of private law, in respect of
which government could only intrude if it did not interfere with
the vested individual property and privacy rights of the presently
privileged classes. That, to my mind, is not the issue. I accept
that there is no sector where law dwells, that is not reached by the
principles and values of the Constitution.116
It is remarkable to find that his opinion, which could be the paradigm of thick
interpretation, continues as though simply an addendum to the defense from
technical inadequacy: "[t]he judicial function simply does not lend itself to the
kinds of factual enquiries.. . which appropriate decision-making on social,
economic, and political questions requires."'" 7 This argument, for what it is
worth, is at least as applicable to the enforcement of positive or socioeconomic
rights, about which Justice Sachs is deeply enthusiastic. Given such
reluctance, even from a judge like Sachs, it is hardly surprising that the one
dissenter, Justice Kriegler, starts his opinion by castigating the majority:
The second point concerns a pervading misconception held by
some and, I suspect, an egregious caricature propagated by
others. That is that so-called direct horizontality will result in an
Orwellian society in which the all-powerful State will control all
private relationships .... That is nonsense. What is more, it is
malicious nonsense preying on the fears of privileged whites,
cosseted in the past by laissez faire capitalism thriving in an
environment where the black underclass had limited opportunity
to share in the bounty. I use strong language designedly. The
caricature is pernicious, it is calculated to inflame public
sentiments and to cloud people's perceptions of our fledgling
constitutional democracy. "Direct horizontality" is a bogeyman." 
8
116 Du Plessis 1996 (5) BCLR 658 para. 177.
.. Id. para. 180.
.. Id. para. 120.
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Justice Kriegler makes a strong case for not just the desirability of direct
horizontal effect, but its necessity:
The way I read the Preamble and the Postscript, the framers
unequivocally proclaimed much more sweeping aims than
those ... apparently accepted by some of my colleagues. Our
past is not merely one of repressive use of State power. It is one
of persistent, institutionalized subjugation and exploitation of a
voiceless and largely defenceless majority by a determined and
privileged minority." 9
His conclusion is very simple, and in many ways more strict constructionist
than the otherwise more conservative majority:
My reading of Chapter 3 gives to the Constitution a simple
integrity. It says what it means and means what it says. There is
no room for the subtleties and nice distinctions so dear to the
hearts of mediaeval theologians and modem constitutional
lawyers. The Constitution promises an "open and democratic
society based on freedom and equality," a radical break with the
"untold suffering and injustice" of the past. It then lists and
judicially safeguards the fundamental rights and freedoms
necessary to render those benefits attainable by all. No one
familiar with the stark reality of South Africa and the power
relationships in its society can believe that protection of the
individual only against the State can possibly bring those
benefits. The fine line drawn by the Canadian Supreme Court in
the Dolphin Delivery case and by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Shelley v. Kraemer between private relationships involving
organs of State and those which do not, have no place in our
constitutional jurisprudence.
... We do not operate under a constitution in which the avowed
purpose of the drafters was to place limitations on governmental
control. Our Constitution aims at establishing freedom and
equality in a grossly disparate society. And I am grateful to the
drafters of our Constitution for having spared us the
" Id. para. 125.
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jurisprudential gymnastics forced on some courts abroad. They
were good enough to say what they mean. The Constitution
applies to all three of the pillars of State and Chapter 3 applies to
everything they do.1
20
The question for us is whether we wish to continue to see western
constitutions as designed solely as though "the avowed purpose of the drafters
was to place limitations on governmental control,"'' or even whether that
option still exists. It is worth remarking that between the interim and final
constitutions, the South African constituent power seems to have had a view:
the language in Section 8(2) of the final Constitution all but strikes out the
arguments used by Kentridge in Du Plessis.22 It must of course be noted that
the South African Constitution is, to use a more American phrase, more
aspirational than any other, or at least more clearly so. After all, as I now go
on to discuss, the Constitution itself (in both the initial interim and the
subsequent final version) in some places quite specifically lists positive rights.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALLY THICK DECISIONS IN THE SECOND DIMENSION
I have given such prominence to Du Plessis in order to underline my
general thesis-what one feels about the legitimacy of any particular
constitutional/legal technique depends overwhelmingly, as it should, on what
one thinks the purpose of a constitution is. Both Justices Sachs and Kriegler
are very clearly on the "thick" end of constitutional interpretation. 23 In fact,
the whole of the court is. In the end, the SACC's fall from grace in this
particular case has had no real effect on the court's general thrust to widen the
reach of the South African Constitution. I shall, relatively briefly, turn now to
the more famous cases dealing with socioeconomic rights, and then to other
cases, harder to categorize, in which this same drive has shown itself. Here
though I want to ask a very simple question: given the politics of most modem
liberal democracies, are the tenets of thin constitutionalism still viable? Even
where there is no recently approved constitutional document, these liberal
democracies can hardly be thought not to embrace the values spelled out more
120 Id. paras. 145, 147.
121 Id. para. 147.
122 Woolman & Davis, supra note 115.
123 See Du Plessis 1996 (5) BCLR 658.
[Vol. 35:277
THICK CONSTITUTIONAL READINGS
directly in the more recent, manifestly "thick" constitutions. I attempt to
provide an answer to this question in the last section.
VII. POSITIVE RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The South African cases most often discussed in the literature are the first
two in which plaintiffs succeeded in getting the SACC to order the state to
provide an actual, tangible good as required by the Constitution. Grootboom
and Treatment Action Campaign,'24 decided in 2000 and 2002, respectively,
remain the clearest examples of the SACC granting socioeconomic rights,
although there have been many other cases with similar results. 25 Some time
before either of these famous cases, however, and in its own way just as
important, was one in which relief was denied, Soobramoney v Minister of
Health (KwaZulu-Natal), decided in 1997.126 In the light of likely reactions to
Chaoulli and of the dissent in that case, Soobramoney is especially important.
In this case, a chronic renal failure patient was refused dialysis in a hospital
because scarce resources were targeted on patients who could be cured or who
were fit enough to be transplant possibilities.'27 Mr. Soobramoney fell into
neither category and had run out of the funds necessary to continue dialysis in
private clinics.'28 He argued that the right-to-life clause in the South African
Constitution required the health service to admit him, and that the state should
make more funds available so that others better placed to benefit would not be
124 Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. & Others v Grootboom & Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) (S. Aft.). Grootboom involved a claim for emergency housing brought by a group of
homeless South Africans who had been forced off land on which they had erected a shantytown.
Though the case is procedurally complex, the court effectively held that there was a positive right
to housing and ordered the local government in question to provide such for the plaintiffs.
TreatmentAction Campaign arose because the government restricted access to a drug that could
prevent an HIV-positive mother from infecting her child during birth. The court did not hesitate
in ordering the government to provide the drug. Minister ofHealth & Others v Treatment Action
Campaign & Others 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) (S. Afr.).
125 A useful survey of South African socioeconomic rights jurisprudence is given in Kevin
Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the InternalLimitations Clauses, 20 S. AFR. J. ON
HuM. RTS. 448 (2004).
126 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (S.
Afr.). This case, as well as others of interest to us here, is discussed in JUDICIALPROTECTION OF
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CuLTuRAL RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (Bertrand G. Ramcharan ed.,
2005).
127 Soobramoney 1997 (12) BCLR 1696.
128 Id.
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denied treatment. 129 The claim was based notjust on a general extension of the
basic right-to-life clause, but on the very specific language which the South
African Constitution uses to provide "positive" rights, in particular Section 27:
27. Health care, food, water and social security
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to-
(a) health care services, including reproductive health
care;
(b) sufficient food and water; and
(c) social security, including, if they are unable to
support themselves and their dependants,
appropriate social assistance.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of each of these rights.
(3) No one may be refused emergency medical
treatment. 30
The court had no difficulty in refusing Soobramoney's claim, largely
because of its reading of subsection (2). "' At this stage in its history, the court
decided the state lacked the resources necessary for the state to be required to
provide the treatment.
132
If all the persons in South Africa who suffer from chronic renal
failure were to be provided with dialysis treatment - and many of
them, as the appellant does, would require treatment three times
a week- the cost of doing so would make substantial inroads into
the health budget. And if this principle were to be applied to all
patients claiming access to expensive medical treatment or
expensive drugs, the health budget would have to be dramatically
increased to the prejudice of other needs which the State has to
meet. 133
129 Id.
30 S. AFR. CoNST. 1996, available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.
htm.
'| Soobramoney 1997 (12) BCLR 1696.
132 Id.
'31 Id. para. 28.
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In combination with this conclusion, the court provides traditional self-
warnings about judicial restraint and shows a useful awareness that the
problems would not be absent even in a richer country. As Justice Sachs
states, "[h]owever the right to life may come to be defined in South Africa,
there is in reality no meaningful way in which it can constitutionally be
extended to encompass the right indefinitely to evade death."' 3 4 What is
important though is that the judgment contains no words that could possibly
be taken to preclude the general idea that the court might order government
action where conditions made it possible. From a comparative perspective, we
ought to view Soobramoney as an example that no one need fear courts being
economically illiterate and spendthrift with national resources. Much of the
argument regarding separation of powers is shown to be irrelevant, as in other
SACC cases in which positive rights are granted. Soobramoney also shows
that it is possible to deny specific positive rights demands without denying
their overall legitimacy. The contrast with Chaoulli marks the latter's extreme
nature.1
35
While one could hardly have predicted from Soobramoney that within a few
years the SACC would become famous for positive rights decisions, let alone
that the first important one would be in the field of health provision, there is
in fact no reason to see this as a change in court policy. 36 The best known
case is the TreatmentAction Campaign case, in which the Constitutional Court
upheld a claim that the Constitution requires the government to extend its very
limited scheme for supplying an antiretroviral drug called Nevirapine to all
131 Id. para. 57.
135 Chaoulli v. Qudbec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791.
136 For analysis of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case, see Joan Fitzpatrick & Ron
C. Slye, Economic and Social Rights-South Africa-Role of International Standards in
Interpreting and Implementing Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights: Republic of South Africa
v. Grootboom and Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 669
(2003). For a more general analysis of the impact of the TAC campaign, see Steven Friedman
& Shauna Mottiar, A Rewarding Engagement? The TreatmentAction Campaign and the Politics
of HIV/AIDS, 33 POL. & SOC'Y 511 (2005). It must not be thought that everyone admires either
the SACC in general or its decision in Soobramoney. Typical of the more critical voices is Lynn
Berat, Constitutional Court Profile-The Constitutional Court of South Africa and
Jurisdictional Questions: In the Interest ofJustice?, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 39 (2005). The author
believes that Soobramoney was far too grudging in its recognition of the rights in question, even
if the actual decision may have been inevitable. In contrast, a more cautiously positive judgment
is rendered in Murray Wesson, Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the Socio-Economic
Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, 20 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 284 (2004).
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pregnant mothers who were HIV positive.13 ' The court was very clear about
its right to hear the case in its arguments about separation of powers, which:
may be relevant in two respects: (i) in the deference that courts
should show to decisions taken by the executive concerning the
formulation of its policies; and (ii) in the order to be made where
a court finds that the executive has failed to comply with its
constitutional obligations. These considerations are relevant to
the manner in which a court should exercise the powers vested in
it under the Constitution. It was not contended, nor could it have
been, that they are relevant to the question ofjusticiability.'38
In some ways the case was a very easy one, largely because it could be cast
in terms of an equality argument. The government was already giving
Nevirapine to patients at some research and training hospitals, and the cost
implications were fairly modest as the drug itself was being provided free.'39
Consequently, the court was able to accept all the limitations of budgetary
constraints and deference to policy choices as long as they were rational: "[a]ll
that is possible, and all that can be expected of the State, is that it act
reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic rights identified in sections
26 and 27 on a progressive basis."' 40 The more powerful logic in this case, a
development from the argument in Grootboom, but developed through further
cases, is the idea that such rights depend for their ultimate justification on the
protection of human dignity: "[n]o one should be condemned to a life below
the basic level of dignified human existence. The very notion of individual
rights presupposes that anyone in that position should be able to obtain relief
from a court."''
Vi. THE ROLE OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Human dignity is the prime value of the constitution and serves as the
touchstone to assess the presence of ajusticiable right rather than any technical
13 Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (10) BCLR
1033 (CC) (S. Afr.).
138 Id. para. 22 (emphasis added).
39 Friedman & Mottiar, supra note 136.
140 Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 para. 35.
141 Id. para. 28.
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distinction between positive and negative.'42 Rather than seeing rights as
isolated claims, the court has stressed that rights are interrelated, and all follow
from "the founding values of human dignity, equality and freedom."' 43 This
is not a mere philosophical reflection; "the proposition that rights are
interrelated and are all equally important, has immense human and practical
significance in a society founded on these values."'" In Khosa, the case from
which the preceding quotation is taken, the court invalidated a policy of
denying non-citizen permanent residents full welfare rights.'45 Though the
case in part depended on a discrimination argument, much of the court's ruling
was openly one of enforcing a positive right to minimum welfare. Justice
Mokgoro, quoted here, also relies on a completely different human rights case,
relating to the right of spouses to settle in South Africa, to make the point
about the fundamental basis in human dignity:
In this case we are concerned with these intersecting rights which
reinforce one another at the point of intersection. The rights to
life and dignity, which are intertwined in our Constitution, are
implicated in the claims made by the applicants. This Court in
Dawood said: "Human dignity . . . informs constitutional
adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value
that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other
rights... Section 10, however, makes it plain that dignity is not
only a value fundamental to our Constitution it is a justiciable
and enforceable right that must be respected and protected.'46
,42 An extensive debate has ensued in South Africa about the centrality of dignity as a driving
force in what is now being called "transformative jurisprudence." Not all commentators are
entirely happy with its centrality, fearing it may take away from the straightforward importance
of equality. See, e.g., Susie Cowen, Can 'Dignity' Guide South Africa's Equality
Jurisprudence?, 17 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 34 (2001); Anton Fagan, Dignity and Unfair
Discrimination: A Value Misplaced anda Right Misunderstood, 14S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTs. 220
(1998).
143 Khosa & Others v Minister of Social Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) para. 40
(S. Afr.) (relying partially on Gov't of the Republic of S. Aft. & Others v Grootboom & Others
2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) (S. Afr.)).
SId.
14' Khosa 2004 (6) BCLR 569.
146 Id. para. 41 (emphasis added) (quoting Dawood & Another v Minister of Home Affairs &
Others 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) para. 35 (S. Afr.)).
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A right to dignity is not a right in any normal way that a thinly read
constitution could embrace, but perhaps the whole point of thick readings is
that the very distinction between a right and a value disappears. Dignity is not,
of course, the only fundamental value which underlies these interlinked rights,
and indeed Khosa, because of its element of discrimination, also focuses
sharply on equality, giving equal status to dignity in the judgment.14 7 But
dignity is crucial because were there not a basic positive right to welfare, the
state might have succeeded in its pragmatic argument for giving welfare
resources only to citizens as an economic necessity. As such, it might have
satisfied the court that the discrimination claim was acceptable under the
limitation clause in the Constitution.
148
The South African Constitutional Court takes further the idea of an
interlinkage between rights by seeing positive rights as having negative rights
aspects, and in particular the court does so when dealing with issues connected
to the traditional horizontal/vertical discussion. In fact, the idea that a positive
right would be justiciable at the very least in this way goes back to the initial
statement in the certification hearing: "At the very minimum, socio-economic
rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion.' ' 149 An example of
this combination of approaches is the Rail Commuters case, where the
plaintiffs sought a declaration that a commuter railway company operating
services with a heavy rate of violent crime was in breach of a constitutional
duty to protect life.' The claim was that the ordinary statutes that applied
must be interpreted in the light of this constitutional value. Their argument,
rejected in the ordinary courts, was that the statutory requirement that the rail
services be operated "in the public interest" be read alongside the
constitutional injunction that "[t]he state must respect, protect, promote and
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights," in particular Sections 11 and 12 of the
Constitution, which promise that "[e]veryone has the right to life" and
"[e]veryone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes
the right... to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private
147 Khosa 2004 (6) BCLR 569.
148 For a very interesting discussion of the way the court relies on dignity conceptions in its
work, though it focuses on rather different cases, see Jonathan Barrett, Dignatio and the Human
Body, 21 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 168 (2005).
149 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR
1253 (CC) para. 78 (S. Afr.).
ISO Rail Commuters Action Group c Others v Transnet Ltd. t/a Metrorail & Others 2005 (4)
BCLR 301 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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sources...."' Justice O'Regan, in the majority opinion, had no difficulty in
holding that the statute in question must be interpreted to "promote the spirit,
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."' 152 She comments that:
The rights contained in the Bill of Rights ordinarily impose, in
the first instance, an obligation that requires those bound not to
act in a manner which would infringe or restrict the right....
The obligation is in a sense a negative one, as it requires that
nothing be done to infringe the rights. However, in some
circumstances, the correlative obligations imposed by the rights
in the Bill of Rights will require positive steps to be taken to
fulfil the rights.'53
The inevitable argument about budgetary implications was raised; however, as
O'Regan states: "an organ of State will not be held to have reasonably
performed a duty simply on the basis of a bald assertion of resource
constraints."'154 The basic argument in Rail Commuters had been made earlier;
for example in S v Baloyi, the court found that the that the Prevention of
Family Violence Act 1993 "has to be understood as obliging the State directly
to protect the right of everyone to be free from private or domestic
violence."' 55 Much followed from the first important case where the obligation
of the courts to develop the common law in the light of the Constitution was
firmly established. Part of the reason that this case, Carmichele, was needed
was to bring thejurisprudence on the development of the common law into line
with the much firmer stand taken by the final Constitution after the weakness
of the court's decision in Du Plessis.156 From Carmichele in 2001 onwards,
a stream of cases has pushed further this basic approach-that nothing should
stand in the way of the instantiation of constitutional values in the working of
the law.'57 Carmichele itself concerned the liability of the police to have
15 S. AFR. CONST. 1996, §§ 7(2), 11, 12(1).
152 Rail Commuters Action Group & Others 2005 (4) BCLR 301 para. 72 (quoting S. AFR.
CONST. 1996, § 39(2)).
153 Id. para. 69.
114 Id. para. 88 (emphasis added).
... S v Baloyi & Others 2000 (1) BCLR 86 (CC) para. 11 (S. Aft.).
156 Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Sec. & Another 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) (S. Aft.).
157 See, e.g., Minister of Home Affairs & Another v Fourie & Others 2006 (3) BCLR 355
(CC) (S. Aft.); Rail Commuters Action Group & Others 2005 (4) BCLR 301; Khosa & Others
v Minister of Social Dev. & Others 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) (S. Aft.); Port Elizabeth
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prevented a rape when they were well advised of its possibility.'58 The court
talked of the need to engage in a proportionality exercise balancing community
and individual interests, but stressed that "that exercise must now be carried
out in accordance with the 'spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights' and
the relevant factors must be weighed in the context of a constitutional State
founded on dignity, equality and freedom and in which government has
positive duties to promote and uphold such values."'59 In the case, the court
deliberately contrasts its perception of this duty to develop the common law
with the Canadian situation, and it distances itself from American doctrines
while expressly supporting the ECHR position in Osman.160 The extent to
which the new, constitutionally enshrined values are to trump other
considerations is given in an extremely interesting suggestion that has much
relevance to my main theme here: "[u]nder section 39(2) of the Constitution
concepts such as... 'the wishes.., and the perceptions... of the people' and
'society's notions of what justice demands' might well have to be replaced, or
supplemented and enriched by the appropriate norms of the objective value
system embodied in the Constitution." 161
The results of other cases include giving extra protection for debtors having
their house taken by lenders in the procedure of the magistrates' courts, 162 the
development of Grootboom in an ever extending list of housing protection
cases for those who have been forced to occupy land for shantytowns, 163 and
even a case where an old law allowing trespassing cattle to be impounded was
found constitutionally wanting because of its threat to the livelihood of the
very poor." Modderklip, mentioned earlier, saw the Constitutional Court
dodge the direct issue of horizontal application, though that claim had been
accepted by the court below. 65 The case is particularly interesting because it
shows the court's continual effort to craft new techniques to deal with the
implications of reading the Constitution thickly. The Constitutional Court
Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) (S. Aft.).
158 Carmichele 2001 (10) BCLR 995.
159 Id. para. 43.
160 Osman v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245 (1998).
161 Carmichele 2001 (10) BCLR 995 para. 56.
162 Jaftha vSchoeman & Others 2005 (1) BCLR 78 (CC) (S. Afr.).
163 See, e.g., President of RSA & Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. & Others 2005
(8) BCLR 786 (CC) (S. Aft.).
"6 Zondi v MECfor Traditional andLocal Gov't Affairs & Others 2006 (3) BCLR 423 (CC)
(S. Aft.).
165 See Modderklip Boerdery 2005 (8) BCLR 786 para. 1 n. 1.
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provided what it described as "constitutional damages" by a route alternative
to horizontal applicability, suggesting again that the characterization of rights
in such a way is simply not helpful.'66 Land had been occupied by squatters
which Modderklip had offered to sell to the local authority. It refused, but
both the squatters and the police also refused to do anything at all to enforce
the eviction order Modderklip had gained from a court.'67 The Constitutional
Court took the interesting line that the rule of law itself was a value the
plaintiff was entitled to have enforced. However, the court argued, eviction
was now impossible because the huge number of squatters who had taken
advantage of the state's inaction.'68 Consequently, the award of damages,
which could be replaced by the authority simply buying the land, would satisfy
both the land need of the squatters and Modderklip's constitutional
entitlement. Whether there is a horizontal effect did not need to be decided
because:
Section 1 (c) of the Constitution refers to the "[s]upremacy of the
Constitution and the rule of law" as some of the values that are
foundational to our constitutional order. The first aspect that
flows from the rule of law is the obligation of the State to provide
the necessary mechanisms for citizens to resolve disputes that
arise between them. 169
Though it might in some sense be more satisfactory to have had an outright
ruling that Modderklip had an enforceable horizontal constitutional right
against the squatters, finding instead a positive right to have the rule of law
enforced is yet another example of the drive the SACC has to find any way
which will work to "thickly" interpret the Constitution to ensure the sway of
its core values over society. This right is a true positive right because:
The obligation on the State goes further than the mere provision
of the mechanisms and institutions referred to above. It is also
obliged to take reasonable steps, where possible, to ensure that
large-scale disruptions in the social fabric do not occur in the
'"Id. para. 20.
167 Id. para. 9.
168 Modderklip Boerdery 2005 (8) BCLR 786.
169 Id. para. 39.
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wake of the execution of court orders, thus undermining the rule
of law. 7'
One might sum up South African jurisprudence as amounting to a
determination to combine all aspects and all the machinery of law to establish
the core values through an understanding that precise differences between
types of rights, which are themselves all intermixed, are irrelevant. The values
both are themselves rights and underpin any specified rights. Though they still
use the terminology of socioeconomic or positive rights, little or nothing seems
to depend on it.
IX. POSITIVE RIGHTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY
The reliance in Modderklip on the rule of law is reminiscent of much of the
most imaginative constitutional interpretations of another set of courts, those
in newly democratic Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).' 7' There exist clearly
stated socioeconomic rights in several of the constitutions of this region.'72
The Hungarian Constitution, for example, provides in Article 70/E that:
"[c]itizens of the Republic of Hungary have the right to social security; in the
case of old age, sickness, disability, being widowed or orphaned and in the
case of unemployment through no fault of their own."' 173 It goes on to require
that "[t]he Republic of Hungary shall implement the right to social support
through the social security system and the system of social institutions.' ' '74
Similar double requirements, that a right be recognized and that the
government set up the necessary machinery, exist for health and education.
Poland has a whole chapter on economic, social, and cultural freedoms and
rights, with provisions such as Article 67:
1. A citizen shall have the right to social security whenever
incapacitated for work by reason of sickness or invalidism as
170 Id. para. 43.
171 An extremely thorough account of the presence of socioeconomic rights in Eastern Europe
is given in Wojciech Sadurski, Enduring and Empowering: The Bill of Rights in the Third
Millennium: Postcommunist Charters of Rights in Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 65 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 223, 227-37 (2002).
172 Similar ideas to those of Poland and Hungary exist throughout the former communist
states, but the legal arguments are best exemplified by the cases from Poland and Hungary.
"' See CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra note 75, at 404.
174 Id.
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well as having attained retirement age. The scope and forms
of social security shall be specified by statute.
2. A citizen who is involuntarily without work and has no other
means of support, shall have the right to social security, the
scope of which shall be specified by statute. 1
75
All the usual socioeconomic rights are covered in the same manner and
similar patterns are found throughout the CEE constitutions.' 76  Not
surprisingly, many of the early decisions of these courts were on
socioeconomic rights, at least in part because the pro-capitalist revolutions
produced inevitable uncertainty on the one area of strength in the socialist
economies, the provision of relatively generous social expenditure. 177 There
is a sense in which the Polish and Hungarian constitutions are less overtly
aspirational than, for example, South Africa's constitution. One has to
remember that because the respective histories are different, the salience of
constitutional value commitments will be as well. No one in CEE had to stress
the priority of welfare rights; rather, the need was to find a way of maintaining
them when other problems were in the forefront. 78 For the Eastern Europeans,
the "rule of law" is what transformation is all about, while in South Africa, it
has been the drive for equality that is all important. 179 The social aspirations
were already present for the Eastern Europeans, though they did indeed fear
losing the historic priority of welfare.80 In both cases, and especially in
Hungary, the jurisprudence of those constitutional guarantees has not usually
presented anything to disturb those dubious of the propriety of positive
rights.1 8' The Hungarian court has regularly held that Article 70/E is satisfied
171 KONSTYTUCJARZECZYPOSPOLITEJPOLSKIEJ 1997 [Constitution ofthe Republic ofPoland]
art. 67, available athttp://www.poland.pl/info/inforrnation-about_poland/constitution/ch2.htm
[hereinafter POL. CONST.].
176 ARATO, supra note 54.
177 SCHWARTZ, supra note 78 (suggesting that the courts were heavily involved in such
issues). There are counterclaims, notably Andris Saj6 who, at the time of writing, does not think
the Hungarian' court is as involved in such issues as might have been expected. Andris Saj6,
Reading the Invisible Constitution: Judicial Review in Hungary, 15 OXFORDJ. LEGALSTUD. 253
(1995).
178 SCHWARTZ, supra note 78.
... Warren Freedman, Understanding the Right to Equality, 115 S. AFR. L.J. 243 (1998)..
... DEMETRIUS S. IATRIDIS, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE: THE IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION (2000).
' LAszlo S61yom, Opening Address, 10th Conference of European Constitutional Courts
(May 5, 1996), in BULLETIN ON CONSTITUTIONAL CASE-LAW (Council of Europe ed., 1996).
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as long as some form of welfare system is in place.1 12 Similarly, there have
been few challenges accepted in Poland that the statutes called for by articles
like Article 67, as created by the Sejm, are inadequate.' 83 Decisions otherwise
would indeed have raised, fatally or not, the problem of separation of powers,
a value the CEE countries, not least their courts, strongly favored during this
period because it was one of the conditions for entry into the European
Union. 184 Where welfare statutes were found at fault, it was more likely
because they offended a different sort of value, especially unjustified or
irrational discrimination, which is a far more "normal," perhaps a purely
"negative," right entitlement.
A good example is a 1993 case concerning problems in interpreting
unemployment and social assistance legislation.185 The Polish Constitutional
Tribunal was clearly concerned that where the relevant act deals with the
provision of social assistance after the period when an unemployed person was
entitled to unemployment benefit, it "lacks a suitable normative content"
because it appears to leave the actual duties of social assistance institutions
under defined.8 6 Nonetheless, the Tribunal's decision was to petition its own
president to launch a Tribunal investigation of the 1990 Social Assistance Act,
rather than to strike down any part of the act under consideration, the 1991
Employment and Unemployment Act.18 7 The constitution, according to the
Tribunal, does contain a guarantee of social justice, and social justice requires
that people not be left helpless after unemployment pay runs out. 188 However,
182 Decision 43/1995 AB of June 30, 1995 on Social Security Benefits, Alkotminybir6sdg
[Hungarian Constitutional Law Court], translated in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra note
75, at 332 [hereinafter Decision on Social Security Benefits].
183 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 63.
184 BUILDING DEMOCRACY? THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF DEMOCRATISATION IN
EASTERN EUROPE (Geoffrey Pridham et al. eds., 1997).
185 Decision of July 13, 1993, P. 7/92, 1993(1) ORZECZNICTWOTRYBUNALKONSTYTUCYJNY
[OTK] 256 [Polish Constitutional Tribunal] [hereinafter Decision on Unemployment Benefits],
translated in SELECTION OF DECISIONS OF THE POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL'S
JURISPRUDENCE FROM 1986-1999, at 103 (Jerzy Oniszczuk ed., 1999) [hereinafter SELECTION
OF DECISIONS]. Although Polish cases are not given names, I have added descriptive names for
convenience. Both the Polish and Hungarian cases I discuss are surveyed in Bojan Bugaric,
Courts as Policy-Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 247 (2001).
186 Decision on Unemployment Benefits, P. 7/92, translated in SELECTION OF DECISIONS,
supra note 185, at 103.
187 Id.; see also Employment and Unemployment Act of Oct. 16, 1991; Social Assistance Act
of Nov. 29, 1990.
188 Decision on Unemployment Benefits, P. 7/92, translated in SELECTION OF DECISIONS,
supra note 185, at 104.
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as the court says itself, "[g]iven its general and legally virtually undefined
nature, the principle ofjustice does not, however, determine the legal form for
the implementation of the justice formula with respect to the unemployed."' 89
No negative rights theorist could object to such a description of the Tribunal's
approach. The court's concern was not that social justice requires any
particular level of social assistance, or even any particular set of qualifications.
Rather it argues "[t]he guarantee function of the law requires that the right to
such an allowance follow from a statute and the eligible person be entitled to
make a claim, the satisfaction of which could be prosecuted in court."' 90
Where it did act decisively was to strike down a part of the 1991 Act, which
differentiated between unemployed people depending on whether they had
previously been involved in agricultural or non-agricultural sectors. This
distinction is simply irrational and unjustified discrimination:
[N]o rational justification can be identified for the differentiation
of citizens based on the form of their earlier professional
activity. . . . [m]atching the State's financial means to its
obligations toward the citizens cannot be achieved through
differentiation that discriminates against legally defined groups
of citizens.' 9'
The thrust of both parts of this decision is the same-expressing the
overriding need for legal values, the proper justifications for unequal
treatment, and the proper concern for legally enforceable rights, as opposed to
concern with the level of rights provision. Very much the same attitudes
colored Hungarian jurisprudence through its great period of activism in the
1990s. 192 Over and again, the court stressed that "[t]he State has a wide margin
of appreciation with respect to changes, regroupings and transformations
within welfare benefits depending on economic conditions."'1 93 All that is
absolutely required is the provision of some welfare system:
189 Id. at 105.
190 Id. at 107.
'9' Id. at 109.
92 The best short account is by the court's first President, LAZ16 S61yom, The Role of
Constitutional Courts in the Transition to Democracy: With Special Reference to Hungary, 18
INT'L SOC. 133 (2003).
' CONSTrrUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra note 75, at 326.
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In [an earlier] decision, the Constitutional Court established as a
general constitutional requirement that the right to social security
contained in Article 70/E of the Constitution entails the
obligation of the State to secure a minimum livelihood through
all of the welfare benefits necessary for the realisation of the
right to human dignity.'94
The state will be "deemed to have met its obligation specified in Article 70/E
by organising and operating a system of social institutions including welfare
benefits. Within this, the legislature can itself determine the means whereby
it wishes to achieve its social policy objectives. '195
It seems that part of the court had struggled in early cases for a more
intrusive role, but relatively early a compromise was struck whereby the
margin of appreciation would be satisfied as long as total welfare provision did
not fall below some notion of a minimum subsistence level.' 96 So in the 1998
decision from which the quotations are taken, proceedings were suspended to
await a report on whether the challenged legislation would still "secure the
minimum livelihood necessary for the realisation of the right to human dignity
in line with the constitutional requirement specified in the holdings."' 97 How
one reacts to this position depends largely on one's substantive political views.
The President of the Hungarian Court at the time, who was on the losing side
in the conflict, sees this as reducing socioeconomic rights to mere "state
goals":
This means that the ordinary test for (subjective) fundamental
rights-necessity and proportionality does not apply. This, in
turn, amounts to a silent acceptance by the whole Court of the
understanding of social rights as being similar to "state goals,"
for which ... only excessive infringements reach the level of
constitutional significance. 9 '
... Decision 32/1998 of June 22, 1998 on Unemployment Assistance, Alkotminybir6sdg
[Hungarian Constitutional Law Court] 402/B/1997, Magyar K6zl6ny [Hungarian Gazette] MK
1998/55.
195 Id.
196 Symposium, Constitutional "Refolution " in the Ex-Communist World. The Rule of Law,
12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 45, 99 (1997).
' Decision on Unemployment Benefits, P. 7/92, translated in SELECTION OF DECISIONS,
supra note 185, at 103.
'9' CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra note 75, at 37.
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Others might more plausibly note that the strict negative liberty theory would
not regard even excessive infringement of Article 70/E as entitling a court to
strike down welfare legislation. They might also note that the minimum level
is to be set by the court, and that it is tied, by the court itself, to the powerful
but elastic conception of human dignity, a phrase which does not occur in the
constitutional provisions for socioeconomic rights. '99 More important perhaps,
is S6lyom's arguably unwarranted equation of a "real" right as one to which
a specific limitation test applies.200 It may well be that a useful distinction
between rights could be based on whether the proportionality/necessity
limitation test or some other test applies. There are several alternative
candidates, including the German conception of retaining the core meaning of
a right, which would here implicate a minimum subsistence test.20 1 But it by
no means follows that the distribution of rights into such categories would map
closely onto the positive/negative rights or rights/state goals distinctions.
Despite this caution, these courts are nonetheless famous for major
intrusions into policy to the point that any orthodox sense of the separation of
powers becomes extremely weak. Both have struck down state retrenchment
of social benefits, especially in the areas of pensions. In both cases, the
government's policy was thought crucial to major economic reform, and in
both cases, the decisions cost the state treasury massive amounts of money.20 2
The crucial point is that both courts relied primarily not on specific
socioeconomic rights, but on fundamental assumptions about the relationship
between society and law. In Poland in 1992, the Tribunal decided a complex
set of issues involving several interrelated statutes that were intended to cut
pension benefits in multiple ways, especially the Act of October 1991 on the
Revaluation of Retirement and Disability Pensions.20 3 The court found parts
of these acts offended Article 67 (nondiscrimination), Article 7 (protection of
personal property), and parts of Article 70.204 The last was a more typical
1' More than any other court in the CEE area, more even than in South Africa, the Hungarian
court has relied on German jurisprudence on human dignity. See Du1R, supra note 79, though
she unfortunately has little to say directly about positive rights.
200 CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra note 75, at 37-38.
20' In fact, the core minimum concept appears in the Hungarian constitution, as it did in the
Interim South African Constitution, in both cases based on the German model, but has been little
used. Andr-s Saj6, How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform, 5 E. EUR. CONST.
REv. 31 (1996).
202 SCHWARTZ, supra note 78.
203 Decision of Feb. 11, 1992 on Pensions Laws, K. 14/91, translated in SELECTION OF
DECISIONS, supra note 185, at 59-71 [hereinafter Decision on Pensions Laws].
204 POL. CONST. 1952 arts. 7, 67, 70.
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socioeconomic rights article, guaranteeing the right to health protection and to
"assistance in the event of sickness or inability to work."2 5 Article 70(2)
stated "[t]his right shall be implemented to an increasing degree by the
development of social insurance to cover sickness, old age and inability to
work, and by enlargement of various forms of social assistance.... 206 These
articles were used almost as additional arguments, however. The real work
was done in the judgment by reliance on the very simple language of Article
1: "[t]he Republic of Poland is a democratic state ruled by law and
implementing the principles of social justice. 2 7 Furthermore, Article 1 was
applied twice, with the Tribunal finding most of the legislation in breach of
both the conception of "a state ruled by law" and, separately in breach of the
idea that the state should implement "the principles of social justice. 2 8
Several of the many clauses struck down were found to be in breach of both
limbs of this clause; the Tribunal found it useful to make these separate attacks
because it seemed to have wished to mark the two lines of criticism as equally
valid.2 9 The social justice arguments largely revolved around the expectation
that pension and similar schemes would promote social solidarity by being
redistributive, an aspect which the new legislation minimized. The Tribunal
does remind itself that "the velocity of change within the realm of economic
and social relations, especially over a period of basic transformations...
demands that the lawmaker be given a relatively broad range of freedom in
moulding the law. 210 It even cites German cases to support its admission that
"[a]s is the case in the constitutional legislation of other democratic States, the
Constitutional Tribunal cannot test if, in detail, the lawmaker chooses the most
expedient and appropriate solution." '211 Nonetheless, in this area, the Tribunal
gave quite detailed objections, citing expert opinion on, inter alia, the need for
and failure to provide a "flattening" of the benefit to contribution ratios.2 12
201 POL. CONST. 1952 art. 70(1).
206 Id. art. 70(2).
207 Id. art. 1.
208 The constitutional articles come from the 1952, i.e., communist constitution, relevant parts
of which were kept in force by Article 77 of the 1992 constitutional act, usually called "The
Small Constitution." POL. CONST. 1992 art. 77. Not until 1997 did Poland adopt an entirely
new post-communist constitution. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal is the only one of the CEE
courts to predate the collapse of communism. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78.
20. Decision on Pensions Laws, translated in SELECTION OF DECISION, supra note 185, at
67-69.
210 Id. at 63.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 66.
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Despite these words of caution, the Polish Tribunal derived a very strong
social justice restriction on the government's plans to deal with the economic
problems of the state:
[R]etirement and disability rights cannot be restricted without
agreeing that the criteria for selecting the types of resources
financed by the State be socially justified and without an
objective conviction that the State is undertaking sufficient
actions to combat economic crisis. Furthermore, the concepts of
social equality and justice signify that "the weight of economic
crisis should encumber all social strata and not specifically affect
only certain strata or groups," especially if these were to have
been pensioners.213
X. THE CENTRALITY OF THE RULE OF LAW
For my purposes, probably the more important argument was the more
purely legal one. It very much represents a "thick" reading of a standard legal
term, the "rule of law." It is common throughout CEE to load the idea of the
rule of law with rather more content than it routinely carries in Western
common law countries, even more than might be expected given that
Rechtsstaat and "rule of law" are synonyms rather than translations.2"4 The
Polish Tribunal, which nearly always uses the compound phrase "a democratic
state ruled by law," from Article 1, has been even more insistent on giving a
rich substantive meaning to the idea than others.2 15 The court starts this aspect
of the ruling in the Pensions case by disposing of the government's claim that
an ongoing economic crisis forced the reduction in pensions.2" 6
Characteristically, it actually makes two points-that the argument was never
actually featured in the parliamentary debates on the statute, and that it could
213 Decision on Unemployment Benefits, P. 7/92, translated in SELECTION ON DECISIONS,
supra note 185, at 105.
214 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule ofLaw" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1997); Stephen L. Esquith, Toward a Democratic Rule ofLaw: East and
West, 27 POL. THEORY 334 (1999). See also, in a different context but still relevant, Robertson,
supra note 32.
215 POL. CONST. 1997 art. 1. See, e.g., Decision of Dec. 4, 2001 on State Liability for Harm
Caused by Unlawful Actions of Its Functionaries, S.K. 18/00; Decision of Feb. 15, 2004 on
Insufficient Vacatio Legis when Introducing Higher Rate of Personal Income Tax, K. 48/04.
216 Decision on Pension Laws, translated in SELECTION OF DECISION, supra note 185, at 59.
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not avail anyway: "If one were to agree that a state of superior economic need
existed, then the Constitutional Tribunal would be unable to derive legal
consequences from that fact for lack of any legal basis in the Constitution. 2 7
Very broadly, and vitally for its overall approach, the Tribunal goes on to say:
Under the rule of law, the law is a phenomenon that is, to a great
extent, autonomous of the State as an organization implementing
defined political tasks and it should not serve to bring to life
political or economic objectives in a manner that may depreciate
the role of the law and its acceptance by society.1 8
This acute awareness of the fragility of law as a social instrument is also
common, for very understandable reasons, throughout the CEE countries.219
For example, a concurring opinion in the parallel Hungarian case on welfare
and pension reform was given precisely to stress this relationship.22 ° Judge
Zlinszky spells this out firmly:
[T]he Court must call the attention of the legislature to the fact
that it can expect the agreement and co-operation of society,
which is the necessary precondition of the success of the reforms,
only if it chooses and requires restrictive measures which meet
the sense of moral and social justice of society.221
The core idea in both the Hungarian and Polish cases is the same: the rule of
law implies predictability, certainty, and the protection of legitimate
expectations. At its strongest, in the language of the Polish Tribunal, "the
social security system takes on the form of a unique type of social contract
governed by the principle ofpacta sunt servanda.'' 222 This idea is itself tied
to the confidence in the law idea: "The rule of law embodies maintaining the
confidence of citizens in the State; the protection of acquired rights (also the
217 Id.
210 Id. at 59.
219 There is some evidence from social psychology that Eastern European mass publics, not
only the judges, attach an unusually high value to procedural propriety. Ellen S. Cohn et al.,
Distributive and Procedural Justice in Seven Nations, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 553 (2000).
220 Decision on Social Security Benefits, translated in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra
note 75, at 332.
221 Id.
222 Decision on Pensions Laws, translated in SECTION OF DECISIONS, supra note 185, at 61.
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non-retroactive effect of law) is tied to the foregoing.... It is very much
a practical judgment, rooted in the Tribunal's idea that the rule of law itself has
clear substantive implications. One problem it sees, for example, is the
suddenness of the government's policy impact. "[T]he citizens of a land ruled
by legality should not be suddenly surprised by regulations that are to their
disadvantage," and therefore the government ought to use transition periods,
and these periods must be long enough to allow citizens to adapt. 224 This
principle is taken far enough indeed to find another part of the act
unconstitutional simply because of an unduly short period before the act's
sunset clause sets in-a mere two years is not long enough, given a very tough
constitutional restriction derived, again, simply from the Article 1 rule of law
clause. "In the realm of social security, only legislative regulations that allow
future pensioners and disability pensioners to engage in long term planning
may constitute effective legal guaranties. 225
It should not be thought that decisions like these are accepted easily by all
political positions in the CEE countries. Not only governments, but
independent social critics can be heard lamenting the breach they see in the
separation ofpowers. Jdnos Kis, a distinguished and usually liberal Hungarian
social philosopher, has roundly attacked the Hungarian court's 1995 decision,
while approving of much of its direct human rights work, with much the same
effect, though without using the language, of the standard negative-rights-only
221position. 6 Critics, however, tend to ignore the general thesis that underlies
this highly "substantive" idea of the rule of law, perhaps because it is only
rarely well spelled out. The Hungarian court has been less sporadic or ad hoc
in its use. There is a constant theme throughout its jurisprudence of the way
in which "legal certainty ... in the view of the Constitutional Court, is the
most substantial conceptual element of a state under the rule of law and the
theoretical basis of the protection of acquired rights. 227
The idea of the rule of law as guaranteeing legal certainty has been used in
a variety of contexts, most notably perhaps in controlling the excesses of
lustration policy by striking down legislative attempts to restart the clock under
223 Id.
224 Id. at 63.
225 Id. at 70.
226 JANOS KIS, CONSTITUIONAL DEMOCRACY 278-94 (2003). An equally negative view is
given in Saj6, supra note 201, at 31. Sadurski, to some extent, shares this negative view of the
utility of socioeconomic rights. Sadurski, supra note 171.
227 Decision on Social Security Benefits, translated in CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra
note 75, at 327.
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the statute of limitations for crimes committed during the Communist era. The
huge theoretical importance of this method of interpreting the doctrine of "a
state under the rule of law" is highlighted rather than negated by the fact that
national constitutional courts in the CEE area have sometimes come to directly
opposed conclusions about what the phrase means in any specific situation.228
In common with the welfare decisions, these lustration decisions, clearly in the
negative rights domain, are deeply empirical in the sense that they take note of
the realities of life in the area. 29 So, for example, the Czech court refuses to
ignore the sheer improbability that the previous regime would ever have
punished the people breaking the law on behalf of the security services, and
refuses to lose track of this fact by an overly formal approach z.23  The Polish
court made detailed analyses of who worked for what agency in what capacity
before issuing a lustration decision.23' Thus, in their welfare decisions, both
of these courts emphasize that no one in a former communist country has had
the chance to make private arrangements for their old age or other welfare, and
most are still unable to afford such measures.232 The vital importance of these
decisions, which I can only lightly sketch here, is that the CEE courts have
effectively held that constitutionalism itself, because of the paramount
importance of the rule of law, makes it impossible to do some things, or to do
them in certain ways. The defense against arguments by critics like Kis is
rather simple-the one thing constitutional courts are specifically about is
ensuring legality. Preventing a government from doing something which
cannot be done legally can never be regarded as stepping outside the
limitations imposed by the separation of powers. And, of course, there is no
surprise about the CEE courts' addiction to legality.233
228 See Robertson, supra note 32, at 227-37.
229 Id.
230 See ndlez Pstavniho soudu 6j. 9/01/ Sbirka ndlezu a usneseni Ostavniho soudu [Czech
Republic Constitutional Court] [hereinafter Lustration II]; Decision of Apr. 20, 2004, K 45/02,
2004 ORZECZNLCTWO TRYBUNAL KONSTYTUCYJNY [OTK] [Polish Constitutional Tribunal].
231 Id.
232 Decision on Social Security Benefits, translated in CONSTrrUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra
note 75, at 332.
233 A good discussion is Jiri Pribdn, Moral and PoliticalLegislation in Constitutional Justice:
A Case Study of the Czech Constitutional Court, 8 J. E. EUR. L. 1 (2001); David Robertson, The
Role of Constitutional Courts in the New Eastern European Democracies, 2005 Public Lecture
at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland (Oct. 3, 2005).
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XI. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
Inevitably the CEE courts differ often in the details oftheirjudgments. As
an example, the Polish Tribunal makes little play with an idea that attracts the
Hungarian Court, the protection of property. Here, we might have a link not
only to other European constitutional doctrines, but even to that of the United
States. According to the Hungarian court: "In the case of social security
benefits where the insurance element has a role to play, the constitutionality
of the reduction or termination of the benefits should be evaluated according
to the criteria of the protection of property." '234 There are echoes here of a
strand of thought in German constitutional and administrative law, where the
emphasis is sometimes, but not invariably, on the need for some element of
contribution to transform a welfare right into a form of property right.235 The
European "welfare as property" concept is a weaker form of this
transformation of a positive rights claim into a property claim to be found in
some American ideas about "the New Property." The "New Property"
argument is more than forty years old now, and has made little progress in the
courts after a flurry of success in the last years of the Warren court, but it
continues to be an important strand in U.S. legal thinking.236 Originally
introduced by Charles Reich in 1964, it was developed further in a later article
into a full-blown thesis of the need to protect individuals against all assaults
on their autonomy. 237 The narrower thesis has travelled widely in the common
law world, though more frequently in administrative law literature than among
writers on constitutional law.23 The essence of Reich's argument is that
traditional property rights are valued as protecting the independence and basis
for flourishing of the individual. But in a modem, highly regulated society,
many of the conditions for such autonomy and human development have come
to be in the discretionary hands of the state. By seeing welfare entitlements,
234 CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY, supra note 75, at 329.
235 As early as the mid-1950s, however, German courts had started handing down rulings
which tended towards a "positive-rights" interpretation of welfare and similar rights under the
Basic Law, often predicated on dignity rights and similar arguments. See Robert Dugan,
Standing, The "New Property, " and the Costs of Welfare: Dilemmas in American and West
German Provider-Administration, 45 WASH. L. REV. 497 (1970).
236 John Allett, New Liberalism & the New Property Doctrine: Welfare Rights as Property
Rights, 20 POLrY 57 (1987).
237 The original article is Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964);
further developed in Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409 (1991).
238 For example, even to Australia. See Ian Holloway, Natural./ustice and the New Property,
25 MONASH U. L. REV. 85 (1999).
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and anything the state controls which has this effect (for example licenses to
practice a profession), as property, these human needs can be put on a much
surer basis. "The aim of these benefits is to preserve the self-sufficiency of the
individual,.. . [to] provid[e] a secure minimum basis for individual well-being
and dignity. .... ,,239 Reich had a host of reasons, the strongest being an appeal
to social justice, when he described welfare rights as "part of the individual's
rightful share in the commonwealth," and "in no sense a form of charity. 24 °
From my point of view, the key to this reading of the Constitution, which
brings it into the same focus as all the rights discussed above in the various
courts' readings of various constitutions, is Reich's claim that "the time has
come for us to remember what the framers of the Constitution knew so
well-that 'a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his
will.' ,,241 Of course Reich's argument is not directly about positive rights-it
is an attempt to turn discretionary government largess into rights so that
welfare claims would come to have the same sort of substantive due process
protection that ordinary property entitlements have had. But it is an example
of the same argumentative strategy-to take values which no one doubts are
inherent in a constitutional settlement and bring other human needs under their
umbrella. In a sense, it is an argument of the form "whatever works, works."
Property is an indisputable good deserving of constitutional protection in the
United States, so the rather weak analogy between welfare entitlements and
property "works." Property rights have been vital in the new CEE
democracies, in Hungary more than anywhere else, so it "works" to find a
property element in pension entitlements. The Hungarian argument could not
be made solely on a property basis, and the human dignity argument, a
mainstay of Hungarian jurisprudence, comes in. But Reich also uses a dignity
argument.242 The German administrative court, which found a "new property"
element in a welfare claim in 1954, also made use of the Sozialstaat
description of the state in the German Basic Law, and of its Article 1
commitment to human dignity.24 3 In Poland and Hungary, but also in the
German cases, the value most useful was simply that of the rule of law-as it
was in some of the South African cases.244 The rule of law works in large part
239 Reich, The New Property, supra note 237, at 785-86.
240 Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965).
24' Reich, The New Property, supra note 237, at 787.
242 Id. at 733-87.
243 Dugan, supra note 235, at 499.
244 President ofRSA & Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd. & Others 2005 (8) BCLR
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because it is a black box into which one can assert very nearly any substantive
value one wants.
In the end, the transformation of a discretionary benefit into a litigable right
is much the same process as the finding of a concrete duty from a "state aim"
or the deriving of a positive right to life strong enough to overturn a health
insurance statute. Nor does there seem to be much difference between any of
these operations on the vertical individual-to-state dimension and the
imposition of constitutional duties between legal individuals on the horizontal
plane, at least through the process of irradiating the law with constitutional
values. All of these are examples of a judicial process which takes
constitutions primarily as value codes that the court must apply though a thick
reading of constitutional texts and laws. The aim in all these cases is to
regulate relations by constitutional values. One might object that such a
process is defensible for some but not all constitutions. That would be to
admit that some constitutions are indeed value documents, but retain the claim
that others states, particularly the United Kingdom and United States, have
entirely procedural and value-free constitutions.
It is unclear that this is a viable option. To start with, the common law must
be at least as dedicated as any code law system, maybe more, to the Polish
argument that "the law is a phenomenon that is, to a great extent, autonomous
of the State as an organization implementing defined political tasks." '245 It is
of note that the "legitimate expectations" argument found so powerful in
Poland and Hungary caused the Law Lords much anxiety, though they
ultimately sidestepped it, in a major U.K. constitutional law case, Council of
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service in 1985.246 But beyond
the problem of what the rule of law may in itself proscribe against
governments is the whole question of whether any rights claims can be handled
entirely without reference to more basic constitutional values. At its simplest,
the problem is this: can a court know whether a particular interest is protected
by a right, such as one in the U.K.'s Human Rights Act, without knowing or
deciding just why the right in question is valued or what its more fundamental
purpose is? If it is not possible to go on for much longer pretending that
constitutional interpretation is an exercise in the application of abstract and
freestanding rights, rather than one of instantiating constitutionally mandated
786 (CC) (S. Aft.).
245 Decision on Unemployment Benefits, translated in SELECTION OF DECISIONS, supra note
185, at 57.
246 Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] A.C. 374 (H.L.).
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values, then no procedural distinctions like those between positive and
negative or vertical and horizontal rights can be of any utility at all.
X1I. CONCLUSION
I have attempted in this Article to come to terms with the fact that much of
the standard conceptual framework for discussing rights produces what one
scholar has aptly called "moral short-fall," which requires explanation.247
Using that scholar's terminology of thick versus thin constitutional law, though
in a rather different sense, I have tried to tease out why this may be so and
what may be done about it.248 For the purposes of this Article, I have selected
two dichotomies basic to much constitutional discussion, those between
positive and negative rights, and between horizontal and vertical application
of constitutional rights. I have characterized these as defining two dimensions,
one of reach and the other of depth of rights. Obviously, there are many other
candidates for conceptual blocks to a constitution delivering full political
justice. Obvious candidates, for example, could be found within the rules and
categories governing standing, but the list of ways in which constitutions may
fail to deliver all that might be desired is likely to be extensive. My first step
was to show that the distinctions themselves are hard to operate and do not
clearly denote differentjudicial actions, even if they formally describe "causes
of action." In a recent Canadian case involving the Charter right to life, I
demonstrate how easy it is to move from a negative to a positive conception
of rights if the judges actually wish to do SO. 249 In general, I maintain that the
actual results of constitutional litigation depend more on this willingness to use
whatever material the constitution contains to deliver its purposes than on any
real block to certain results. Thus, a "thick" reading of a constitution is, in a
sense, analogous to the "purposive" or "teleological" rules of statutory
interpretation to be found in basic texts on the construction of statutes.250
I have taken a thickly read constitution to be one where judicial argument
is heavily influenced by a sense of a fundamental purpose lying behind the
constitution. By taking examples from two jurisdictions that have recently
replaced highly undemocratic systems, South Africa and Central and Eastern
247 Sager, supra note 4, at 410.
248 Id.
249 Chaoulli v. Qu6bec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791.
250 See, e.g., D. NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1997).
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Europe, which can both be seen as "transformatory" in the language
increasingly used in South Africa, I have attempted to show how useless the
distinctions referred to are, given an overwhelming drive to deliver justice in
the terms of the perceived constitutional purpose. Instead of focusing on such
rules about rights, I show that what motivates these courts is the need to
deliver a form of justice wherever it is needed. The South Africans rely very
heavily on ideas about human dignity, which is seen as both a pervasive value
and a specific right. The Central and Eastern Europeans rely on the crucial
importance of reestablishing the rule of law in a way that gives to this most
orthodox of all legal concepts its own rich or thick reading. Although I have
no space to analyze German cases directly, it is clear that in both of these
jurisdictions, German constitutional thinking is highly influential. This is even
more likely to be the case because the post-war Federal German Constitution
was the first of the new type of overtly transformatory constitutions, and in
Germany and those countries influenced by it, it is unthinkable that a
constitution should be the "value free" road map, or "large scale organization
chart" that traditional liberal theory seems to require.251
To some extent, the role of a constitution necessarily depends on the way
it was introduced, if only because the more clearly the constitution is
legitimated by an informed citizenry, the safer it is for judges to assert the
values they wish to see pervading all law, regardless of prior categorizations.
Thus, while it is easy to make the case for South Africa or Poland and
Hungary, it may be a less plausible argument elsewhere. However, not only
have I demonstrated in the Canadian case that such a thick reading is possible,
but I suggest there are plenty of other signs of such readings legitimately
becoming more common. The United Kingdom, under the Human Rights Act
1998, is now required to follow the jurisprudence of the ECHR, and this has
long given up in practice, if not entirely in doctrine, any real interest in either
of the categorizations I discuss in this Article. 2 I also suggest that there are
and have in the past been some signs of U.S. constitutional law being, in some
circles at least, a good deal less hostile to positive rights and horizontal
application than usually thought. In the end, I suspect that all jurisdictions will
have to move in this direction in order to retain and build constitutional
legitimacy.
251 See Winf'ied Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools ofJurisprudence, andAnthropology:
Some Remarks from a German Point of View, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 395 (1994). For an account
of how Germany has influenced Eastern European courts, see DuPRI, supra note 79.
252 Lisa Conant, Individuals, Courts, and the Development of European Social Rights, 39
COMP. POL. STuD. 76 (2006).
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